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Abstract
In this work, we adopt a cooperative game theoretic approach in order to
tackle the social ridesharing (SR) problem, where a set of commuters, connected
through a social network, form coalitions and arrange one-time rides at short
notice. In particular, we address two fundamental aspects of this problem. First,
we focus on the optimisation problem of forming the travellers’ coalitions that
minimise the travel cost of the overall system. To this end, we model the forma-
tion problem as a Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation (GCCF) one, where
the set of feasible coalitions is restricted by a graph (i.e., the social network).
Our approach allows users to specify both spatial and temporal preferences for
the trips. Second, we tackle the payment allocation aspect of SR, by propos-
ing the ﬁrst approach that computes kernel-stable payments for systems with
thousands of agents. We conduct a systematic empirical evaluation that uses
real-world datasets (i.e., GeoLife and Twitter). We are able to compute optimal
solutions for medium-sized systems (i.e., with 100 agents), and high quality so-
lutions for very large systems (i.e., up to 2000 agents). Our results show that
our approach improves the social welfare (i.e., reduces travel costs) by up to
36.22% with respect to the scenario with no ridesharing. Finally, our payment
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: filippo.bistaffa@univr.it (Filippo Bistaﬀa),
alessandro.farinelli@univr.it (Alessandro Farinelli), gehalk@intelligence.tuc.gr
(Georgios Chalkiadakis), sdr@ecs.soton.ac.uk (Sarvapali D. Ramchurn)
Preprint submitted to Artiﬁcial Intelligence February 17, 2017
allocation method computes kernel-stable payments for 2000 agents in less than
an hour—while the state of the art is able to compute payments only for up to
100 agents, and does so 84 times slower than our approach.
Keywords: Coalition formation, ridesharing, social networks, graphs
1. Introduction
The concept of real-time ridesharing, where people arrange one-time rides at
short notice with their private cars, is rapidly shifting the way people com-
mute for their daily activities. Companies such as Maramoja1 or Lyft2 allow
users to quickly share their positions and arrange rides with other people they
know/trust within minutes, hence providing a credible alternative to standard
transportation systems (such as taxis or public transport). A clear trend for
such companies is to build a community of users, where commuters can rate
drivers/passengers, and then use such information to automatically form groups
of commuters that know/trust each other. Following this trend, here we provide
an approach that, given the desired starting point and destination, and the time
constraints on the pick-up and the arrival of the commuters, can form groups
that share cars to lower associated transportation costs (i.e., travel time and
fuel), while considering the constraints imposed by the social network. We call
this problem the social ridesharing (SR) problem. In particular, we provide a
model for the SR problem casting this as a Graph-Constrained Coalition For-
mation (GCCF) problem. Speciﬁcally, following relevant literature on GCCF
[36, 45], we consider a coalition to be feasible, only if the commuters involved
in such coalition form a connected subgraph of the social network.
Within such SR scenario, we ﬁrst address the optimisation problem of min-
imising the total cost of all the coalitions formed by the system. Given this, we
deﬁne the value of each coalition as the travel cost of the associated car. Specif-
ically, we present the ﬁrst model that encodes the above discussed scenario as a
1https://maramoja.co.ke.
2https://www.lyft.com.
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GCCF problem, and we provide a novel formulation of coalitional values on the
basis of the spatial preferences of the agents. Subsequently, we generalise our
model incorporating the temporal preferences of the agents, so to allow them
to express constraints on the departure and the arriving time. Our approach
allows us to derive eﬃcient methods for the computation of the path and the
departure time of the driver, which provide the optimal solution the considered
model.3 Finally, we show how to solve the GCCF problem associated to the SR
scenario by means of a modiﬁed version of CFSS (i.e., the state of the art ap-
proach for solving GCCF), a branch and bound algorithm proposed in previous
work [7] that is based on the graph-theoretic concept of edge contraction. Specif-
ically, in this paper we propose SR-CFSS, which signiﬁcantly extends CFSS by
implementing a novel bounding technique devised for the SR scenario, and by
ensuring the validity of the constraints imposed by our SR model.
We empirically evaluate our approach on real-world datasets for both spatial
(i.e., GeoLife by Microsoft Research [50]) and social data (i.e., Twitter [30]).
Results show that our approach can produce signiﬁcant cost reductions (up
to −36.22% with respect to no ridesharing) and it scales to large numbers of
agents, computing approximate solutions for very large systems (i.e., up to 2000
agents) and providing good quality guarantees (i.e., 71% of the optimal in the
worst case) within minutes.
Having solved the optimisation problem posed by GCCF, we then turn to
the problem of splitting the travel costs (corresponding to each car) among
its passengers, i.e., we solve the payment allocation problem. Payments to the
commuters need to be computed given the passengers’ distinct needs (e.g.,
shorter/longer trips), roles (e.g., drivers/riders, less/more socially connected)
and opportunity costs (e.g., taking a bus, their car, or a taxi).
One key aspect of payment allocation in Coalition Formation (CF) is the
game-theoretic concept of stability, which measures how agents are keen to
maintain the provided payments instead of deviating to a conﬁguration deemed
3In general, both these problems are not tractable [27, 31].
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to be more rewarding from their individual point of view. Here, we induce stable
payments in the context of the SR problem, employing the kernel [14] stability
concept. Kernel-stable payoﬀs are perceived as fair, since they ensure that agents
do not feel compelled to claim part of their partners’ payoﬀ. Kernel stability
has been widely studied in cooperative game theory, and various approaches
have been proposed to compute kernel-stable payments [29, 39]. However, as we
discuss in Section 5, state of the art approaches exhibit ineﬃciency (i.e., they do
not avoid considering infeasible solutions) and redundancy (i.e., they consider
coalitions more than once). These drawbacks severely limit their scalability. In
contrast, a better way to tackle this problem is to exploit the structure of the
graph in order to consider only the coalitions that are indeed feasible, so to
avoid any unnecessary computation.
We achieve this by means of the PK (Payments in the Kernel) algorithm,
our method to compute a kernel-stable allocation given a coalition structure,
and we apply it to the SR scenario. In particular, we address the shortcomings
of the state of the art algorithm [39] in real-world scenarios, by designing an
eﬃcient parallel approach that scales up to thousands of agents. Speciﬁcally,
we benchmark PK adopting the same realistic environment used for testing
SR-CFSS, showing that our method computes payments for 2000 agents in less
than an hour and it is 84 times faster than the state of the art in the best case.
Moreover, our method can be eﬃciently parallelised, i.e., it achieves a speed-up
of 10.6× on a 12-core CPU with respect to the serial approach.
Finally, we develop new insights into the relationship between payments
incurred by a user by virtue of its position in its social network and its role
(rider or driver). In general, our experimental results suggest that the kernel can
be a valuable stability concept in the context of SR, as it results in a reasonable
payment allocation that can be directly correlated with some simple properties
of the agents in the system (i.e., network centrality and being a driver/rider).
In more detail, this paper advances4 the state of the art as follows:
4Aspects of this work had already been presented in [8, 9]. This paper presents a signif-
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• We model SR as GCCF that considers the desired starting point and
destination, and the time constraints on the pick-up and the arrival.
• We propose SR-CFSS, a signiﬁcantly extended version of CFSS (i.e., the
state of the art approach for solving GCCF), to provide optimal solutions,
and approximate solutions with quality guarantees for large-scale systems.
• We propose PK, the ﬁrst approach able to compute kernel-stable payments
for systems with thousands of agents.
• We evaluate our algorithms with realistic datasets, i.e., GeoLife from Mi-
crosoft Research for the geospatial data and Twitter for social networks.
Results show that SR-CFSS computes optimal solutions in minutes for
systems including up to 100 agents, and provides approximate solutions
for systems including up to 2000 agents, with good quality guarantees
(i.e., with a maximum performance ratio of 1.41 in the worst case). PK is
able to compute payments for 2000 agents in less than an hour and it is
84 times faster than the state of the art in the best case.
• We analyse the relationship between payments incurred by a user by virtue
of its position in the social network and its role (rider/driver).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the background
on the GCCF problem, the kernel, and discusses the relationship between our
work and the existing literature. Section 3 details our GCCF model for SR
and Section 4 extends such model to include time constraints. In Section 5 we
discuss PK, our approach to compute kernel-stable payments. Sections 6 and 7
present our experimental evaluation, where we benchmark SR-CFSS and PK,
respectively. Section 8 concludes the paper and outlines future work.
icantly extended model, which allows each commuter to express temporal preferences, i.e.,
agents can specify an ideal pick-up and arriving time. This extension is of utmost importance
in order to provide a SR model that can be applied in realistic scenarios, in which time signif-
icantly inﬂuences the travel needs of the commuters and, hence, plays a fundamental role for
SR. Furthermore, we conduct an additional experimental evaluation on real-world datasets,
in order to investigate the inﬂuence of the introduction of time constraints on our approach.
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2. Background & related work
The purpose of this section is threefold. In Section 2.1 we deﬁne the GCCF
problem, and we provide some background on the state of the art algorithm
to solve it, i.e., CFSS. In Section 2.2 we discuss payment computation and the
stability concept adopted by our approach, i.e., the kernel. Finally, in Section 2.3
we discuss the relationship between our work and the literature on ridesharing.
2.1. GCCF problem deﬁnition
The Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) problem [38] takes as input a ﬁnite
set of n agents A = {a1, . . . , an} and a characteristic function v : 2A → R, that
maps each coalition S ∈ 2A to its value, describing how much collective payoﬀ
a set of players can gain by forming a coalition. A coalition structure CS is
a partition of the set of agents into disjoint coalitions. The set of all coalition
structures is Π (A). The value of a coalition structure CS is assessed as the sum
of the values of its composing coalitions, i.e., V (CS) =
∑
S∈CS v (S) .
CSG aims at identifying CS∗, the most valuable coalition structure, i.e.,
CS∗ = argmaxCS∈Π(A) V (CS). The computational complexity of the CSG
problem is due to the size of its search space. In fact, a set of n agents can
be partitioned in Ω(( nln(n) )
n) ways, i.e., the nth Bell number [6], since, in stan-
dard CSG, every possible subset of agents is potentially a valid coalition.
In many realistic scenarios, constraints inﬂuence the process of coalition
formation. Following the work of Myerson [36] and Demange [16], and more
recent work by Voice et al. [44, 45], in this paper we focus on a speciﬁc type of
constraints that encodes synergies or relationships among the agents and that
can be expressed by a graph, where nodes represent agents and edges encode the
relationships between the agents. In this setting, edges enable connected agents
to form a coalition and a coalition is considered feasible only if its members
represent the vertices of a connected subgraph. In order to model these settings,
Myerson [36] ﬁrst proposed a deﬁnition of feasible coalition by considering an
undirected graph G = (A,E), where E ⊆ A×A is a set of edges between agents,
representing the relationships between them:
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Deﬁnition 1 (feasible coalition). A coalition S is feasible if all of its members
are connected in the subgraph of G induced by S, i.e., for each pair of players
ai, aj ∈ S there is a path in G that connects ai and aj without going out of S.
Thus, given a graph G the set of feasible coalitions is FC (G) = {S ⊆ A |
The subgraph induced by S on G is connected}. A Graph-Constrained Coali-
tion Formation (GCCF) problem is a CSG problem together with a graph G,
where a coalition S is considered feasible if S ∈ FC (G). In GCCF problems a
coalition structure CS is considered feasible if each of its coalitions is feasible,
i.e., CS (G) = {CS ∈ Π(A) | CS ⊆ FC (G)}. The goal for a GCCF problem
is to identify CS∗, which is the most valuable feasible coalition structure, i.e.,
CS∗ = argmaxCS∈CS(G) V (CS). After the deﬁnition of the GCCF problem, we
now present CFSS, the state of the art algorithm to solve it.
2.1.1. The CFSS algorithm
CFSS [7] is a search-based algorithm that solves the GCCF problem. CFSS
works by representing the solution space CS (G) of the GCCF problem as a
rooted search tree, which is guaranteed to contain each CS ∈ CS (G) only once
without any redundancy. Each solution in such search tree is constructed by a
unique sequence of edge contraction operations starting from the initial graph
G. Intuitively, the contraction of an edge represents the merging of the coalitions
associated to its incident vertices, as shown in Figure 1. Such an operation can
be used to generate the entire search space CS (G), which can be traversed with
polynomial memory requirements in order to ﬁnd the optimal solution. This is
possible because CFSS is based on a depth-ﬁrst traversal (see Algorithm 9 in
Appendix C) of the search tree, and, hence, at each point of the search, only the
ancestors of the current node need to be maintained in memory. For this reason,
CFSS can solve large-scale GCCF instances with more than 2000 agents [7]. The
superior scalability of CFSS with respect to classic CSG solution algorithms is
also possible thanks to the reduced search space that must be explored, due to
the presence of the graph that constrains the number of feasible coalitions. An
in-depth discussion about the CFSS algorithm is provided by Bistaﬀa et al. [7].
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{a1}
{a2}
{a3}
{a4}
(a) Before contraction
{a2}{a1, a3}{a4}
(b) After contraction
Figure 1: Example of an edge contraction.
Having discussed the optimisation part of GCCF, we now discuss the second
fundamental aspect of CF, i.e., payment computation, which, as mentioned in
the introduction, is crucial in the context of SR.
2.2. Payment computation
The payment computation problem involves the computation of a payoﬀ vector
x, which speciﬁes a payoﬀ x[i] for each agent ai ∈ A as a compensation of their
contributions. This problem has been thoroughly studied in the cooperative-
game theory literature, thus we suggest the reader to refer to the book by Chalki-
adakis et al. [10] for a more extensive discussion of all the technical aspect on
this subject. In the context of this discussion, we are particularly interested in
computing payoﬀ vectors that are eﬃcient (i.e., the entire value of S is split
among the members of S) and individually rational (i.e., each agent ai receives
a payoﬀ x[i] that is at least the value of its singleton). Eﬃciency and individ-
ual rationality are fundamental in real-world applications such as SR, as they
formalise natural properties that are often assumed in practice. Eﬃciency ex-
presses the principle that the entire travel cost of each car should be divided
among its passengers, while individual rationality states that a rational agent
does not join a car if such an action results in a cost higher than going alone.
Furthermore, computing payments that are stable is of utmost importance
in systems with selﬁsh rational agents, i.e., agents who are only interested in
the maximisation of their payoﬀs [10]. As such, payoﬀs have to be distributed
among agents to ensure that members are rewarded according to their bargain-
ing power [10]. Stability ensures that agents will not deviate from the provided
solution to a diﬀerent one that is better from their individual point of view. In
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cooperative game-theory, stability has been deﬁned with several concepts, e.g.,
the stable set, the nucleous, the kernel, and the core [10]. The core is one of the
most widely studied stability concepts, but its computation has an exponential
complexity with respect to the number of agents [11]. As such, it is not suitable
for large-scale systems, as conﬁrmed by our past research [43]. Furthermore, it
is not guaranteed that core-stable solutions always exist [10], as evidenced by
our experiments in Appendix B. Thus, in this paper we focus on the kernel.
2.2.1. The kernel
The kernel is a stability concept introduced by Davis and Maschler [14]. A key
feature of the kernel is that it is always possible to compute a kernel-stable
payoﬀ allocation. Moreover, a number of approaches [8, 29] can compute an
approximation of the kernel when the size of coalitions is limited in a polynomial
time with respect to the number of agents. The kernel provides stability within
a given coalition structure, and under a given payoﬀ allocation, by deﬁning
how payoﬀs should be distributed so that agents cannot outweigh (cf. below)
their current partners, i.e., the other members of their coalition. Kernel-stable
payoﬀs are perceived as fair,5 since they ensure that agents do not feel compelled
to claim part of their partners payoﬀ. We deﬁne the excess of a coalition S
with respect to a given payoﬀ vector x as e (S, x)=v (S)−x (S), where x (S) =
∑
ai∈S x[i]. A positive excess is interpreted as a measure of threat: in the current
payoﬀ distribution, if some agents deviate by forming coalition with positive
excess, they are able to increase their payoﬀ by redistributing the coalitional
excess among themselves. On this basis, we deﬁne the notion of surplus.
Deﬁnition 2 (surplus). Given a coalition structure CS and a coalition S ∈ CS,
5Fairness can also be achieved by considering the Shapley value [10]. Nonetheless, comput-
ing the Shapley value is computationally intractable in general and next to impossible in large
settings (see, e.g., [17, 33]). Of course, approximation approaches exist for speciﬁc classes of
games [4] and in fact a fully polynomial-time Shapley-value approximation scheme does exist
for super-modular environments [32]; however, super-modularity cannot be readily assumed
in our domain. At the same time, practical algorithms for approximating the Shapley value in
graph-restricted games have recently appeared [40]. Testing these approaches in our domain
is future work.
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we consider ai, aj ∈ S. Then, the surplus sij of ai over aj with respect to a given
payoﬀ conﬁguration x, is deﬁned by
sij = max S′∈2A
ai∈S′,aj /∈S′
e (S′, x) , (1)
In other words, sij is the maximum of the excesses of all coalitions S
′ that
include ai and exclude aj , with S
′ not in the given coalition structure CS (since
under CS agents ai and aj belong to the same coalition S). We say that agent
ai outweighs agent aj if sij > sji. When this is the case, ai can claim part of
aj ’s payoﬀ by threatening to walk away (or to expel aj) from their coalition.
When any two agents in a coalition cannot outweigh one another, the payoﬀ
vector lies in the kernel – i.e., it is stable. In addition, the set of kernel-stable
payoﬀ vectors is always non-empty [10].
Stearns [41] provides a payoﬀ transfer scheme which converges to a vector
in the kernel by means of payoﬀ transfers from agents with less bargaining
power to their more powerful partners, until the latter cannot claim more payoﬀ
from the former. Unfortunately, this may require an inﬁnite number of steps to
terminate. To alleviate this issue, Klusch and Shehory [29] introduced the -
kernel in order to represent an allocation whose payoﬀs do not diﬀer from an
element in the kernel by more than . The current state of the art approach
to compute an -kernel payoﬀ allocation for classic CF has been proposed by
Shehory and Kraus [39] (see Algorithm 4 in Section 5). Such an algorithm does
not specify how x should be initialised, and assumes that a payoﬀ vector is
provided as an input. The ﬁrst (and most expensive) phase is the computation
of the surplus matrix s, which iterates over the entire set of coalitions to assess
the maximum excess (Equation 1) for each pair of agents in each coalition. Once
the surplus matrix has been computed, a transfer between the pair of agents
with the highest surplus diﬀerence (i.e., sij − sji) is set up, while ensuring
that each payment is individually rational. This scheme is iteratively executed
until the ratio between the maximum surplus diﬀerence δ and the value of the
considered coalition structure is within a predeﬁned parameter . This ensures
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that the computed payoﬀ allocation is -kernel stable. On the one hand, the
computation of Equation 1 is a key bottleneck for classic CF, since it involves
enumerating an exponential number of coalitions, i.e., Θ (2n). On the other
hand, when the size of the coalitions is limited to k members, such an algorithm
has polynomial time complexity [39], since the coalitions are O
(
nk
)
[29].
Despite having polynomial time complexity under certain assumptions, such
an approach has some drawbacks that hinder its applicability in real-world sce-
narios, and especially in the SR scenario we consider. First, it is designed for
classic CF, failing to exploit the graph-constrained nature of this problem. Sec-
ond, this algorithm assumes that computation of the characteristic function has
a O (1) time complexity (e.g., coalitional values are stored in memory or pro-
vided by an oracle). This hypothesis, although appropriate in several settings,
does not apply to SR, in which the value of a coalition is the solution of a
routing problem, which cannot be assessed with a O (1) time complexity (see
Sections 3.1 and 3.2). Furthermore, coalitional values cannot be stored in mem-
ory, as it would require tens of GB even for medium-sized instances (e.g., 100
agents). These shortcomings lead to ineﬃciencies that prevent the application
of the method proposed by Shehory and Kraus in our case (see Section 5).
Having discussed the approaches to address the two main aspects of CF, in
the next section we elaborate on the existing literature on ridesharing.
2.3. Related work
We now elaborate on related work in the areas of ridesharing and temporal
constraint optimisation.
2.3.1. Ridesharing
Ridesharing poses several challenges that have been addressed by a number
of works in the Artiﬁcial Intelligence literature. In the context of optimisation,
most studies [5, 22, 46, 47] tackle only one or two particular objectives [1] among
the followings: minimise the overall distance travelled by the cars in the system,
minimise the overall travel time, or maximise the number of participants. This
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allows to achieve solutions of tractable computational complexity, but, on the
other hand, these approaches do not generalise to scenarios such as SR, in which
a more complex cost model is considered (see Section 3). Speciﬁcally, Baldacci
et al. [5] adopt a Lagrangian column generation method in order to compute
the optimal way of assigning commuters to cars while minimising unmatched
participants. A similar objective is pursued by Ghoseiri et al. [22], who also try
to fulﬁl individual preferences such as age, gender, smoke, and pet restrictions.
Several papers [46, 47] consider an agent-based system where autonomous rider
and driver agents locally establish ride-shares with the objective of maximising
the number of served riders. Winter and Nittel [46] consider a setting where
short-range wireless communication devices (e.g., Bluetooth or WiFi) are used,
showing that limiting the information dissemination between agents provides
a beneﬁt in terms of computation requirements, while it does not signiﬁcantly
impact the solution quality. Xing et al. [47] consider a highly dynamic ride-share
system where drivers and riders are matched en-route.
Recently, Kamar and Horvitz [26] addressed the computational aspects re-
lated to ridesharing, proposing an interesting model to evaluate ridesharing
plans, on which we base our model for SR. In particular, such work is mostly
focused on incentive design aspects for ridesharing. Similarly, Kleiner et al. [28]
and Zhao et al. [49] tackle the same challenge adopting a mechanism design
perspective. Now, we also focus on the computation of incentives (in the form of
payments), but, in contrast with the above works, we focus on the computation
of payoﬀs that are stable in a game-theoretic sense, which is fundamental in
contexts with selﬁsh rational agents.
As a ﬁnal remark, notice that none of the works in the literature consider
the role of the social network as we do, which, as mentioned in the introduction,
is crucial for real-world ridesharing services.
2.3.2. Temporal constraint optimisation
Problems involving time constraints arise in various areas of computer science,
especially in the context of scheduling [15] and vehicle routing [13, 42]. In par-
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ticular, Dechter [15] deﬁne the so-called Simple Temporal Problems (STP), a
particular type of Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) in which a variable τi
corresponds to a continuous time point and a binary constraint (τi, τj) is associ-
ated to one time range that contains the valid values for τj−τi. In the context of
SR, if τ1 and τ2 are respectively the departure and the arrival time for a partic-
ular agent, the constraint (τ1, τ2) associated to the range [0
′, 60′] means that its
arrival cannot happen more than 60 minutes after its departure. Khatib et al.
[27] later extended the concept of STP associating a function (i.e., a preference)
to each constraint, in order to diﬀerentiate among valid solutions and select the
one that best meets such preferences. The authors also characterise the complex-
ity of solving such problem (denoted as STPP) as NP-Complete in the general
case, while it is tractable if preferences are expressed by linear functions. Such
complexity results by virtue of the fact that STPPs with linear preferences can
be expressed as Linear Programming (LP) problems, which can be solved in
polynomial time [12]. However, even if our preferences are linear (Equations 12
and 13), our time domain is discrete, resulting in a problem of Integer LP, which
is NP-Hard in the general case [12]. Nonetheless, our formalisation allows us to
restrict such problem to a particular, tractable case. Speciﬁcally, our scenario
requires to compute only the optimal departure time for the ﬁrst point in the
path, i.e., τ∗S , since we assume no delay between the arrival to a point and the
departure for the next point in the path (Equation 11).6
These challenges have also been studied in the Vehicle Routing Problem
(VRP) literature [13, 42], and, speciﬁcally, in the context of the Vehicle Routing
Problem with Time Windows (VRPTW) [25]. To the best of our knowledge,
these works adopt a diﬀerent perspective with respect to our approach, as their
main focus is on logistics challenges (e.g., routing, scheduling). While these
6If we drop such an assumption (i.e., we allow a delay between the arrival to each point and
the departure for the next one), our model can be easily formalised as an STPP. Even if such
an STPP is still untractable in the general case due to the discretisation of the time domain,
it can be transformed to a tractable LP problem by means of LP relaxation techniques [12].
Further investigation is required to determine the eﬀectiveness of such an approach, which
will be considered as future work.
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aspects also appear in our paper, here we are mainly interested in studying and
solving the SR problem from a CF perspective, i.e., solving the CSG and the
payment computation problems.
3. A GCCF approach for SR
The social ridesharing (SR) problem considers a set of riders A = {a1, . . . , an},
where n > 0 is the total number of riders, and a non-empty7 set of drivers
D ⊆ A, containing the riders owning a car. Notice that our SR approach cannot
increase the number of cars in the system, i.e., SR can only improve the traﬃc
or leave it unaﬀected. Every driver ai ∈ D can host up to seats (ai) riders in his
car, including himself, where the function seats : A → N0 provides the number
of seats of each car. If ai /∈ D, then seats (ai) = 0.
The map of the geographic environment in which the SR problem takes
place is represented by a connected graph M = (P,Q), where P is the set of
geographic points of the map and Q ⊆ P × P is the set of edges among these
points. Each edge is associated to a length by means of the function λ : Q → R+,
where R+ = {i ∈ R | i ≥ 0}. Similarly, we deﬁne R− = {i ∈ R | i ≤ 0}. N+ and
N
− are deﬁned in the corresponding ways.
Deﬁnition 3 (path). A path composed by m points, each belonging to P , is
represented as an m-tuple, denoting as L[k] the kth point of L. A path is allowed
to cross the same point multiple times.
Deﬁnition 4 (set of paths L). L is the set of all paths among the points in P .
Each rider ai ∈ A has to commute from a starting point pσi ∈ P , i.e., its pick-up
point, to a destination pωi ∈ P .
A key aspect of the SR scenario is the presence of a social network, modelled
as a graph G = (A,E) with E ⊆ A×A, which restricts the formation of groups.
To this end, we deﬁne a feasible coalition as follows.
7If D = ∅ the problem is trivial, as the only solution is represented by the singletons.
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Deﬁnition 5 (feasible coalition for SR). Given a graph G and a set of riders
S ⊆ A, S is a feasible coalition if it induces a connected subgraph on G, and if
it contains at least one rider whose car has enough seats for all the members.
Formally, we state such a requirement as follows.
Constraint 1. |S| > 1 =⇒ ∃ai ∈ S ∩ D : seats (ai) ≥ |S|, i.e., at least one
rider has a car with enough seats for all the riders.
Notice that such a constraint allows a rider ai /∈ D to be in a singleton. In fact,
if the total number of available seats is less than the total number of riders in
the system, such a rider might need to resort to public transport paying a cost
k ({ai}) for the ticket. Formally, the function k : Asingle−Dsingle → R− provides
such a cost, where Asingle = {{ai} | ai ∈ A}, and Dsingle = {{ai} | ai ∈ D}.8 If
ai ∈ D, then {ai} is not associated with any value by k (·), as we assume that
such riders always prefer to use their car with respect to public transport.9
Now, in several ridesharing online services (e.g., Lyft and Uber) a commuter
declares whether he is available as a driver or as a rider, hence the two sets are
disjoint and a feasible set of riders S contains at most one driver. Formally, the
following additional constraint must hold:
Constraint 2. |S ∩D| ≤ 1, i.e., the number of drivers per coalition can be 0
(i.e., S contains a single rider without a car) or 1.
Notice that Constraint 2 is optional, but it holds in several established real-
world services, arising from aspects of practical nature.10 Nonetheless, since our
approach supports a more general model, it can also be applied to scenarios
where such a constraint does not hold. Having deﬁned our notion of a feasible
8Notice that the function k (·) receives a singleton formed by a rider as an argument.
9This assumption does not impact on the generality of our model, as we assume that
each commuter ﬁrst evaluates its preferences and opportunity costs (i.e., whether it is more
convenient to take the car or the public transport) and then, based on this, declares its status of
driver or rider, before the execution of the algorithm. Given the short-lived nature of each run,
we assume that each agent does not change its status during the execution of the algorithm.
Notice that, before the next potential run, each agent is allowed to revise its decision.
10For instance, in the BlaBlaCar service each driver rides its own car.
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coalition, in the following section we detail how we associate a value to each
feasible coalition, i.e., we deﬁne the characteristic function properly.
3.1. Coalitional value deﬁnition
When a shared car is arranged, it drives through a path that contains all the
starting points and destinations of its passengers. Notice that not all the per-
mutation of these points are valid (e.g., it is not reasonable to go to a rider’s
destination and then to its starting point). More formally, a valid path must
fulﬁl two constraints to correctly accommodate the needs of all the passengers.
Deﬁnition 6 (valid path). Given a feasible set of riders S and a path L ∈ L
of m points, L is said to be valid if the following constraints hold:
Constraint 3. ∃ai ∈ S : seats (ai) ≥ |S| ∧ L[1] = pσi ∧ L[m] = pωi , i.e., L goes
from the driver’s starting point to its destination.
Constraint 4. ∀ai ∈ S ∃x, y : L[x] = pσi ∧ L[y] = pωi ∧ x < y, i.e., for each
rider, its starting point precedes its destination.
Notice that a valid path can cross the same point multiple times.11 We refer to
the set of all valid paths for a given feasible set of riders S with VL (S). VL (S)
is always non-empty, since we assume that M is a connected graph.12
Following Kamar and Horvitz [26], we deﬁne v (S) as
v (S) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
k (S) , if S ∩D = ∅,
t (L∗S) + c (L
∗
S) + f (L
∗
S) , otherwise,
(2)
where L∗S represents the optimal path for S (Equation 3). On the one hand, if
S ∩D = ∅, Constraint 1 imposes that S is formed by a single rider without a
11If a path goes through the starting point/destination of an agent more than once, we
assume that the car stops only the ﬁrst time.
12A valid path that always exists starts from the driver’s starting point, then, for each
passenger, goes to its starting point and to its destination, and ends at the driver’s destination.
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car, hence its cost is provided by k (S). On the other hand, if S contains at least
one driver, its value is the sum of the following negative13 cost functions:
• t : L → R−, i.e., the time cost of driving through a given path,
• c : L → R−, i.e., the cognitive cost14 of driving through a given path,
• f : L → R−, i.e., the fuel cost of driving through a given path,
Finally, we deﬁne the function value : L → R− as the sum of the above three
functions, i.e., value (L) = t (L) + c (L) + f (L). We assume that such functions
are additive, as deﬁned in what follows.
Deﬁnition 7 (additivity). A function z : L → R− is said to be additive if,
given two paths L1, L2 ∈ L such that the last point of L1 is the ﬁrst of L2, then
z (L1 ⊕ L2) = z (L1) + z (L1), where ⊕ represents the concatenation of paths.
Additivity trivially applies to any cost function in real-world ridesharing sce-
nario. Notice that we do not assume that the above cost functions are monotonic
with respect to the length of the path, i.e., longer paths can results in lower costs.
Finally, L∗S represents the optimal path for S, deﬁned as
L∗S = argmax
L∈VL(S)
value (L) . (3)
Considering this, a SR problem can be easily translated into a GCCF problem,
as each feasible set of riders is indeed a feasible coalition and v (·) provides its
coalitional value. Hence, CS∗ represents the optimal coalition structure which
maximises the social welfare (i.e., minimises the total cost) for the system.
However, the computation of the optimal path in Equation 3 is NP-hard [31],
which would not be solvable in realistic scenarios. Hence, in the next section we
show how a reasonable assumption allows us make such computation tractable,
by means of well-known optimisation techniques [20].
13Since we consider a maximisation problem, we represent costs as negative values.
14The fatigue incurred by the driver during the trip [26].
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Figure 2: Example starting points and destinations for 2 riders.
3.2. Optimal path computation
The computational complexity of Equation 3 is due to the size of its search
space, formed by all the valid paths for S, i.e., all the paths in the graph M
that contain the starting points and destinations of the members of S in an order
that satisﬁes Constraints 3 and 4. Notice that, given a particular sequence of
starting points and destinations that satisﬁes such constraints, the solution space
of Equation 3 contains multiple valid paths, as the following example shows.
Figure 2 shows an example map containing the starting points and desti-
nations of 2 agents, in which only one sequence of points is valid, i.e., L =
〈pσ1 , pσ2 , pω2 , pω1 〉. Nonetheless, the set of valid paths is much larger (i.e., 33 = 27
valid paths), since there exist 3 possible paths for each of the 3 pairs of consec-
utive points in L. However, it is reasonable to assume that the driver will go
through the shortest path for each of these 3 pairs of points.15
Assumption 1. When the driver has to go from one point in L to the next
one, it will choose the shortest path (considering λ (·)) connecting such points.
Assumption 1 allows us to collapse the search space of Equation 3 to VT (S).
Deﬁnition 8 (VT (S)). Given a feasible coalition S, VT (S) is the set of tuples
that contain all and only the starting points and destinations of the members of
S (without repetitions) and that satisfy Constraints 3 and 4.
In order to explain how to simplify the solution of Equation 3 given the above
assumption, we deﬁne the function concat (·).
15In the case of a coalition formed by a single driver, the path does not depend on Equa-
tion 2, since the driver will always go through the shortest path from its starting point to its
destination. In the case of multiple agents per car, the driver can choose among all the valid
sequences of points (see Equation 4), and the optimal total path may not be the shortest one.
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Deﬁnition 9 (concat (·)). Given L ∈ VT (S), the function concat : VT (S) → L
provides the path obtained as the concatenation of all the shortest paths between
one point in L and the following one. Formally, concat (L) is a tuple deﬁned as
concat (L) =
⊕|L|−1
k=1 sp (L[k], L[k + 1]) , where sp : P × P → R+ provides the
shortest path between two points, considering the length provided by λ (·).
The function concat (·) can be computed in O ((|L| − 1) · (|Q|+ |P | · log |P |)),
assuming that sp (·) is implemented using Dijkstra’s algorithm [18]. Moreover,
if M is a euclidean graph, concat (·) can be computed in O ((n− 1) · |Q|) with
the A* algorithm [24]. Against this background, Equation 3 can be rewritten as
L∗S = argmax
L∈VT (S)
value (concat (L)) , (4)
by exploiting the additivity property (Deﬁnition 7) of the value (·) function.
Notice that the search space of Equation 4 is VT (S), which is signiﬁcantly
smaller than VL (S) in Equation 3, and although being still exponential with
respect to |S|, such computational complexity is manageable for reasonably sized
groups of riders. In fact, VT (S) contains only 2520 valid tuples for |S| = 5 (i.e.,
the number of seats of an average car). Such a result allows us to evaluate each
coalition S by means of Equation 2, and hence we can address SR as GCCF.
Furthermore, on the basis of Assumption 1 we later formulate Proposition 2,
the fundamental theoretical result that allows us to compute an upper bound
for the SR characteristic function. This, in turn, allows us to use the CFSS
algorithm [7] to solve the SR problem eﬃciently.
3.3. Solving the Social Ridesharing problem with CFSS
In order to solve the SR problem, the original version of CFSS [7] must be mod-
iﬁed to assess the additional constraints introduced in Section 3. In particular,
to ensure that Constraint 1 and Constraint 2 hold, we must avoid the formation
of coalitions which are not feasible sets of riders. This is achieved by preventing
the contractions of the green edges that would result in the violation of such
constraints. Notice that such edges must be marked in red (see Section 2.1.1
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above), even if we are not visiting the corresponding subtrees. In fact, this is
equivalent to traversing such search spaces and discarding any solution they may
contain, because such solutions would violate the above mentioned constraints.
A crucial feature of CFSS is the use of a branch and bound search strategy to
prune signiﬁcant parts of the search space, which can be used if the characteristic
function is the sum of a superadditive and a subadditive part, i.e., an m + a
function [7]. However, Equation 2 is not m+ a, since it depends on L∗S , and in
particular on the actual position of the starting points and destinations.
As an example, consider Figure 3, which shows the starting points and des-
tinations for 3 riders, i.e., A = {a1, a2, a3}, in which only a1 owns a car, i.e.,
D = {a1}. For simplicity, we assume that v (S) is equal to the length of L∗S ,
and k ({a2}) = k ({a3}) = −1. In this example, v ({a1}) = −3, v ({a2}) = −1,
v ({a3}) = −1. However, we notice that pσ2 and pω2 are actually part of the path
travelled by a1, hence it is reasonable for a2 to join a1 in the coalition {a1, a2}.
In fact, v ({a1, a2}) = v ({a1}) = −3 > v ({a1}) + v ({a2}) = −3− 1 = −4. The
optimal path for S = {a1, a3} is L∗S = 〈pσ1 , pσ3 , pω3 , pω1 〉. On the other hand, a3’s
starting point and destination are outside a1’s path, hence ridesharing is not
eﬀective in this case: v ({a1, a3}) = −7 < v ({a1}) + v ({a3}) = −3 − 1 = −4.
Notice that this particular characteristic function cannot be seen as the sum of a
superadditive and a subadditive part, since it exhibits a superadditive behaviour
for some coalition structures, i.e., v ({a1, a2}) > v ({a1}) + v ({a2}), while it is
subadditive for some others, i.e., v ({a1, a3}) < v ({a1}) + v ({a3}).
Hence, in the next section we provide alternative bounding techniques that
can be used in our ridesharing scenario to use branch and bound within CFSS.
pσ1 p
σ
2 p
ω
2 p
ω
1 p
σ
3 p
ω
3
1 km
Figure 3: Example starting points and destinations for 3 riders.
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3.3.1. Bound computation
Given a feasible coalition structure CS in our search tree, we now show how to
compute an upper bound M (CS) for the values assumed by the characteristic
function in ST (CS), i.e., M (CS) ≥ V (CSi) ∀CSi ∈ ST (CS), where ST (CS)
is the subtree (i.e., a portion of the entire search tree) rooted at the node corre-
sponding to CS. ST (CS) can be also seen as the set of all coalition structures
that cover CS (i.e., ST (CS) = {CS′ | ∀S ∈ CS ∃S′ ∈ CS′ such that S ⊆ S′}).
We use this value to avoid visiting ST (CS) if M (CS) is not greater than the
current best solution. This allows us to realise the same pruning technique dis-
cussed in [7] in the context of m+ a functions.
In what follows, we provide a method to computeM (CS) in scenarios where
Constraint 2 holds. In these environments it is not possible to merge two coali-
tions that each contain one driver, since only single riders not owning a car are
allowed to join existing groups. It is easy to see that the addition of a rider to
a feasible coalition S can only result in a greater cost. This principle allows us
to prove Proposition 1. First, we deﬁne Ad (CS).
Deﬁnition 10 (Ad (CS)). Given a coalition structure CS, Ad (CS) is the set of
coalitions in CS that contain at least one driver, i.e., the set of cars. Formally,
Ad (CS) = {S ∈ CS | S ∩D = ∅}.
Proposition 1. If Constraint 2 holds, for any feasible coalition structure CS
M1 (CS) =
∑
S∈Ad(CS)
v (S) (5)
is an upper bound for the value of any CS′ in ST (CS), i.e., the subtree rooted
in CS. Formally, M1 (CS) ≥ V (CS′) for all CS′ ∈ ST (CS) .
Proof. See Appendix A.
We now discuss how to compute an upper bound without assuming Constraint 2.
We ﬁrst make the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 11 (Pab). Pab is the set of the starting points and destinations of
all the riders, i.e., Pab = {p ∈ P | ∃ai ∈ A : p = pσi or p = pωi } .
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Deﬁnition 12 (Ppairs). Ppairs is the set of all the pairs of diﬀerent points in
Pab, i.e., Ppairs = {(p, q) ∈ Pab × Pab | p = q} .
Deﬁnition 13 (P1,a (ai) and P1,b (ai)). Given a rider ai ∈ A, P1,a (ai) is the
set of all the shortest paths from ai’s starting point to the starting points and
destinations of any other rider, i.e., P1,a = {L | L = sp (pσi , p) ∀p ∈ Pab : p =
pσi }. Similarly, we deﬁne P1,b (ai) considering ai’s destination.
Deﬁnition 14 (P2,a (ai) and P2,b (ai)). Given a rider ai ∈ A, P2,a (ai) is the
concatenation of all the pairs of shortest paths from ai’s starting point to the
starting points and destinations of any other rider, i.e., {L | L = sp (pσi , p) ⊕
sp (pσi , q) ∀ (p, q) ∈ Ppairs : p = pσi and q = pσi }. Similarly, we deﬁne P2,b (ai)
considering ai’s destination.
Deﬁnition 15 (m (·)). The function m : A → R− is deﬁned as
m (ai) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
max
L∈P1,a(ai)
value (L) + max
L∈P1,b(ai)
value (L) , if ai ∈ D
max
L∈P2,a(ai)
value (L) + max
L∈P2,b(ai)
value (L) , otherwise.
(6)
(7)
Intuitively, the purpose of m (ai) is to provide an upper bound on the value (·)
function corresponding to the edges incident on pσi and p
ω
i , when such edges
are part of a path L driven by a car. If ai is a driver, such an upper bound is
calculated by considering the best edges (i.e., the ones that maximise value (·))
incident on each point (Equation 6). In contrast, if ai is not a driver, Equation 7
considers the best pairs of edges incident on each point. We now provide an
example to better explain how the m (·) function is calculated.
Figure 4 shows the starting points and destinations of 3 riders, in which the
edges represent the shortest paths between any pair of points (under Assump-
tion 1). Furthermore, assume that a coalition is formed among such agents, and
that a1 and a2 are drivers, while a3 is not. Notice that we do not know in advance
whether a1 or a2 will be the optimal driver of such a car. For the sake of brevity,
in the following discussion we only refer to the agents’ starting points, but the
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same concepts apply symmetrically to the destinations. Notice that, since a3
is not a driver, pσ3 will necessarily be an inner point in L (Constraint 3). It
follows that L contains exactly two undirected edges incident on pσ3 . Since we
are interested in computing an upper bound on value (·), we consider the pair
of edges incident on pσ3 that maximises such function (Equation 7).
On the other hand, since we do not know in advance if a1 (resp. a2) will be
the optimal driver of the car, we cannot predict whether pσ1 (resp. p
σ
2 ) will be
the ﬁrst point or an inner point in L. In other words, we do not know exactly
whether one or two edges incident on pσ1 (resp. p
σ
2 ) will be part of L. Therefore,
in Equation 6 we assume that only one edge is present in L, as a conservative
measure. This is guaranteed to provide an upper bound on value (·), as such a
function is negative and, hence, the value of the best pair of edges is lower than
the value of the best single edge. We now deﬁne M2 (·) on the basis of m (·).
Deﬁnition 16 (M2 (·)). The function M2 : CS (G) → R− is deﬁned as
M2 (CS) =
1
2
·
∑
ai∈Ud(CS)
m (ai) , where Ud (CS) =
⋃
S∈Ad(CS)
S. (8)
Intuitively, Ud (CS) is the set of all agents (both riders and drivers) that are
passengers of a car in CS. The 12 term is necessary since, if we sum all the
values of the couples of edges incident to the points that form a given path, we
consider each edge twice.
We now prove the following lemma, that will support the proof of Proposition 2.
pσ1
pσ2 p
ω
2
pω1 p
σ
3 p
ω
3
Figure 4: Example starting points and destinations for 3 riders.
23
Lemma 1. Given a feasible coalition structure CS and a coalition structure
CS′ ∈ ST (CS) such that V (CS′) > M2 (CS), then
∃S′ ∈ Ad (CS′) : v (S′) > 1
2
·
∑
ai∈S′
m (ai) . (9)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Building upon this lemma, we now prove Proposition 2. Notice that, as previ-
ously mentioned, Proposition 2 is based on the validity of Assumption 1, which
is also the key concept that allows us to compute the optimal path for a given
coalition using Equation 4 in a feasible amount of time.
Proposition 2. If Assumption 1 holds, for any feasible coalition structure CS
M2 (CS) is an upper bound for the value of any CS
′ in ST (CS), i.e., the subtree
rooted in CS. Formally, M2 (CS) ≥ V (CS′) for all CS′ ∈ ST (CS) .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Propositions 1 and 2 allows us to compute an upper bound on V (·) for all the
coalition structures in ST (CS). As a consequence, we can solve the SR problem
by adopting a branch and bound approach based on CFSS [7], which we call SR-
CFSS (Algorithm 1). In addition to the diﬀerent bounding technique, SR-CFSS
diﬀers from CFSS as it enforces Constraint 1 and, optionally, Constraint 2, which
ensure the computation of a correct solution for the SR problem. Speciﬁcally,
this is achieved by including an additional check (i.e., line 4 in the SR-Children
routine) that discards the solutions that violate such constraints. Notice that
SR-CFSS derives all the anytime approximate properties of CFSS, since we can
apply the technique discussed in [7] using M1 (·) or M2 (·) respectively deﬁned
in Equations 5 and 8. Intuitively, we can stop the execution of SR-CFSS after
a given time budget and provide the best coalition structure found during the
search. Furthermore, we employ our bounding techniques to compute an upper
bound on the value of the characteristic function in the remaining part of the
search space. In our experiments in Section 6.5, SR-CFSS provides solutions
that are guaranteed to be at least the 71% of the optimal.
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Algorithm 1 SR-CFSS(G)
1: Gc ← G with all green edges
2: best ← Gc {Initialise current best solution with singletons}
3: Front ← ∅ {Initialise search frontier Front with an empty stack}
4: Front.push (Gc) {Push Gc as the ﬁrst node to visit}
5: while Front = ∅ do {Branch and bound loop}
6: node ← Front.pop () {Get current node}
7: if M2 (node) > V (best) then {Can also useM1 (node) with Constraint 2}
8: if V (node) > V (best) then {Check function value}
9: best ← node {Update current best solution}
10: Front.push (SR-Children (node)) {Update Front}
11: return best {Return optimal solution}
The model deﬁned in Section 3 takes into account only the spatial aspect of
the SR problem. In what follows, we show how to incorporate the time prefer-
ences of the commuters in our model and algorithms.
Algorithm 2 SR-Children(Gc)
1: G′c ← Gc = (A, E , colour) {Initialise graph G′ with Gc}
2: Ch ← ∅ {Initialise the set of children}
3: for all e ∈ E : colour (e) = green do {For all green edges}
4: if GreenEdgeContr (G′c, e) meets Constr. 1 (and Constr. 2) then
5: Ch ← Ch ∪ {GreenEdgeContr (G′c, e)}
6: Mark edge e with colour red in G′c
7: return Ch {Return the set of children}
4. Time constraints for Social Ridesharing
We now assume that each rider ai ∈ A speciﬁes its desired departure time τσi
within the time window θσi = [τ
σ
i −ασi , τσi +βσi ] ⊆ N+.16 Similarly, ai expresses
its preferences on the arriving time τωi by means of the time window θ
ω
i =
[τωi − αωi , τωi + βωi ] ⊆ N+. Figure 5 shows an example of such time constraints.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each agent ai expresses reasonable
time preferences on the arriving time (e.g., if ai is a driver, the arriving time
16We consider a discrete time domain, e.g., seconds or minutes.
25
timeline
τσi − ασi τσi + βσi
τσi
τωi − αωi τωi + βωi
τωi
ai’s trip
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ω
i
Figure 5: Example of departure and arriving time constraints.
under the hypothesis that she drives alone should not be outside θωi ). Notice
that, for the sake of generality, our model includes both the upper bound for
start time and lower bound for arrival time, even if they may appear not very
common. Such bounds can be easily “removed” by setting them to +∞ and
−∞, respectively. We include these time preferences in Equation 2 as follows:
v (S) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
k (S) , if S ∩D = ∅,
t (L∗S) + c (L
∗
S) + f (L
∗
S) + θS (L
∗
S , τ
∗
S) , otherwise,
(10)
where L∗S and τ
∗
S represent the optimal path and the optimal departure time
for S (Equation 15), respectively. We deﬁne value (L∗S , τ
∗
S) = t (L
∗
S) + c (L
∗
S) +
f (L∗S) + θS (L
∗
S , τ
∗
S). We introduce the term θS : VL (S) × N+ → R− as a
measure of the extent to which the time preferences of the members of S have
been fulﬁlled by a trip starting at a given time and going through a given
valid path. We quantify such an extent with a cost for each starting point and
destination that is proportional to the time diﬀerence between the actual pick-
up/arriving time and the desired one. In order to formally deﬁne such a cost,
denoted as θS (L, τ) (where τ is the departure time), we ﬁrst deﬁne the arrival
time at each point p of L given τ as timeL : L× N+ → N+, i.e.,
timeL (p, τ) = τ +
∑j−1
k=1
δ (L[k], L[k + 1]) , where L[j] = p, (11)
where δ : Q→N+ measures the travel time trough a given edge. We assume that
δ (·) does not change during the execution of the algorithm, given its short-lived
nature. We deﬁne ΔσS : S×VL (S)×N+ → R− and ΔωS : S×VL (S)×N+ → R−
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(for starting points and destinations respectively) for each ai ∈ S, i.e.,
ΔσS (ai, L, τ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
γ1 · |timeL (pσi , τ)− τσi |, if timeL (pσi , τ) ∈ θσi ,
−∞, otherwise,
(12)
ΔωS (ai, L, τ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
γ2 · |timeL (pωi , τ)− τωi |, if timeL (pωi , τ) ∈ θωi ,
−∞, otherwise,
(13)
Finally, we deﬁne θS (L, τ) as
θS (L, τ) =
∑
ai∈S
ΔσS (ai, L, τ) + Δ
ω
S (ai, L, τ) , (14)
where τ is the departure time and γ1, γ2 ∈ R+ are the costs associated to one
time unit of delay/anticipation for starting points and destinations respectively.
Notice that, even if other formulations for θS are possible, the crucial feature is
the enforcement of the hard constraint (i.e., θS = −∞) outside θi.
Equations 12 and 13 induce hard constraints on the departure/arriving time
for each ai ∈ S, as each ai is not willing to leave/arrive earlier that τi − αi nor
later than τi+βi. Thus, we deﬁne θS = −∞ if any of the constraints is violated.
Deﬁnition 17 (temporally infeasible coalition). S is said to be temporally
infeasible if θS (L, τ) = −∞ for all L ∈ VT (S) and all τ ∈ θσj ∀aj ∈ S ∩D.
We deﬁne the optimal path L∗S and the optimal departure time τ
∗
S as follows:
(L∗S , τ
∗
S) = argmax
L∈VL(S)
τ∈θσj ∀aj∈S∩D
value (L, τ) . (15)
We reduce the search space for L∗S in Equation 15 by applying the same tech-
niques discussed in Section 3.2 (i.e., by considering Assumption 1) and obtaining
(L∗S , τ
∗
S) = argmax
L∈VT (S)
τ∈θσj ∀aj∈S∩D
value (concat (L) , τ) . (16)
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In Equation 16, the computation of τ∗S is still carried out in a na¨ıve way, going
through every possible timestep in the time windows speciﬁed by the drivers in
S. In the following section, we explain a better approach to compute τ∗S .
4.1. Optimal departure time computation
In this section we address the problem of computing the optimal departure
time τ∗S for a given coalition S. Speciﬁcally, we now propose an algorithm to
compute the best departure time for a car S (given a tuple L ∈ VT (S) and a
driver aj ∈ S ∩D), so to avoid trying every possible departure time for the trip
of S. Algorithm 3 achieves this by considering the ideal departure time of the
driver, i.e., τσj , and by applying a sequence of shifts so to obtain the optimal τ .
First (lines 1–7), we initialise τ with the ideal departure time of the driver,
and we initialise p, n and z, which will respectively count the number of points
in which we register an arriving time that is late, early or on time, with respect
to the desire expressed by the agents for those points. The variables post and
antic function as guards to check to what extent it is possible to delay/anticipate
departure without violating any time constraint. Finally, we also deﬁne diﬀs
which contains the diﬀerence between the actual and the ideal time, for every
point in L. Lines 8–11 set these variables. After this, at line 12 we check whether
it is possible to satisfy all the time constraints. If the conditional statement is
true, then at least two points are outside of their time window, one is late and
one is ahead of time, or it may be necessary to anticipate τ of a given amount,
but such action would result in the violation of another constraint. In such
cases we return a null solution. If no constraints are violated, we improve τ in
the cycle at lines lines 13–26 so that
∑|L|
i=1 |diﬀs[i]| is minimised and does not
invalidate any constraint. Notice that, to achieve this result, it is enough to
check the direction of the points of the path. On the one hand, if the majority
of the points are positive (the car is late) we anticipate τ . On the other hand,
if the majority of the points are negative (the car is early) we delay τ .
Once we have a method to compute the optimal τ given a tuple L ∈ VT (S)
and a driver aj ∈ S ∩D, we can ﬁnally compute the optimal path L∗S and the
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Algorithm 3 OptimalDepTime(L, aj)
1: τ ← τσj {Initialise current best solution with driver’s ideal departure time}
2: p ← 0 {Positive points counter (i.e., points where L is late)}
3: n ← 0 {Negative points counter (i.e., points where L is early)}
4: z ← 0 {Zero points counter (i.e., points where L is on time)}
5: post ← +∞ {Maximum delay without constraint violation}
6: antic ← −∞ {Maximum anticipation without constraint violation}
7: diﬀs ← 〈{Diﬀerences among ideal times and actual times}
8: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |L|} do {For all tuple points}
9: diﬀs[i] ← diﬀerence between timeL (i, τ) and ideal arriving time at L[i]
10: Increment p or n or z based on the sign of diﬀs[i]
11: Update post and antic
12: if post < antic then return ∅ {Conﬂict between two constraints}
13: repeat
14: shift ← 0
15: if post < 0 then shift ← post
16: else if antic > 0 then shift ← antic
17: else if p > n+ z and antic < 0 then {Majority of points are late}
18: lwp ← lowest positive in diﬀs
19: shift ← −min{lwp,−antic}
20: else if n > p+ z and post > 0 then {Majority of points are early}
21: grn ← greatest negative in diﬀs
22: shift ← min{−grn, post}
23: if shift = 0 then
24: τ ← τ + shift
25: Update diﬀs, recompute p, n, and z, and update antic and post
26: until shift = 0
27: return τ
optimal driver a∗S by modifying Equation 16 in the following way:
(L∗S , a
∗
S) = argmax
L∈VT (S)
aj∈S∩D
value (concat (L) ,OptimalDepTime (L, aj)) . (17)
L∗S and a
∗
S are computed by selecting the best combination over the possible
valid tuples in VT (S) and drivers in S. For each of these combinations, we
consider the corresponding optimal departure time provided by Algorithm 3. If
such algorithm returns a null solution, the corresponding value (·) is −∞, and
hence, that particular combination is discarded. Equation 17 implicitly provides
τ∗S , which is the optimal departure time for the maximising L
∗
S and a
∗
S . Notice
29
that, following the same discussion at the end of Section 3.2, the search space of
Equation 17 is at most 2520 ·5 = 12600 combinations of valid tuples and drivers
for |S| = 5, and thus, it can be exhausted with a manageable eﬀort.
For some coalitions it is impossible to satisfy all time constraints. Such coali-
tions are given a value of −∞ by Equations 12 and 13, and hence, they can never
be part of the optimal solution. However, the techniques discussed so far detect
such infeasibility only after the execution of Algorithm 3. By contrast, we would
identify such coalitions in advance and avoid their formation within SR-CFSS.
By doing so, we could reduce the search space, hence improving the performance
of our approach. We now show how we achieve this objective.
4.2. Detecting temporally infeasible coalitions
In this section we propose a method that allows us to prune parts of the search
space that are guaranteed to always contain temporally infeasible coalitions (i.e.,
coalitions characterised by a set of time constraints that is not satisﬁable), which
cannot therefore appear in any feasible solution.
One simple approach would be to check, for each solution CS computed
during the traversal of the search tree, if CS contains a temporally infeasible
coalition, and in such case, discard CS and the corresponding subtree ST (CS).
Unfortunately, such a technique can lead to the exclusion of valid solutions.
Speciﬁcally, given a coalition structure CS that contains a temporally infeasible
coalition, ST (CS) (i.e., the portion of the search space rooted at CS) can indeed
contain valid solutions, and, hence, ST (CS) cannot be entirely pruned. We
provide the following example to better explain this concept. Let S = {a1, a2}
with a1 ∈ D (i.e., a1 is the driver), and let θσ1 = [09:00 − 15′, 09:00 + 15′] and
θσ2 = [09:45 − 15′, 09:45 + 15′]. Assuming that the path that links pσ1 and pσ2
(i.e., the starting points of a1 and a2 respectively) corresponds to a travel time
of 10 minutes, it is not possible to ﬁnd a departure time τ such that a1 does
not arrive too early at pσ2 . Thus, θ
σ
2 will always be violated, and hence, S is
temporally infeasible. Now, assume that, as the result of an edge contraction,
S′ = S ∪ {a3} is formed, with θσ3 = [09:20− 15′, 09:20 + 15′]. If the paths from
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pσ1 to p
σ
3 and from p
σ
3 to p
σ
2 both require 10 minutes, it is possible to satisfy the
time constraints of all the members of S′. Hence, S′ is not temporally infeasible.
Nevertheless, under certain conditions it is possible to identify a particular
type of temporally infeasible coalitions that will always result in other tempo-
rally infeasible coalitions as a result of an edge contraction. Such coalitions can
be safely discarded from FC (G), pruning a signiﬁcant portion of the search
space. Intuitively, if there exists a passenger ai whose temporal preferences in-
duce a time window outside the driver’s time window (e.g., ai latest departure
time is earlier that the driver’s earliest departure time), any coalition involving
these two agents will always be temporally infeasible.
Proposition 3. Let ai, aj ∈ A with ai ∈ D and aj ∈ D. If we consider Con-
straint 2 (i.e., one driver per car) and [τσj + β
σ
j , τ
ω
j − αωj ] ⊆ [τσi − ασi , τωi + βωi ],
then ai and aj can never be in a time feasible coalition together, i.e., ∀S ∈
FC (G) : {ai, aj} ⊆ S, S is a temporally infeasible coalition.
Proof. See Appendix A.
If we consider a scenario that enforces Constraint 2, then Proposition 3 can
be used to identify couples of agents (ai, aj) that can never be part of the
same coalition, eﬀectively introducing some additional hard constraints on the
formation of coalitions. Such constraints can be easily expressed by marking
each edge (ai, aj) (if existent) as red in the initial graph G, so to avoid the
formation of a coalition in which ai and aj are together. On the other hand, if
ai and aj are not connected by an edge in G, we introduce a new red edge, since
if we do not do so, then ai and aj will be part of the same coalition for at least
one coalition structure in the search tree. As an example, consider Figure 6.
a1
a2 a3
Figure 6: Example of a social network with 3 agents.
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Assume that a2 and a3’s time constraints satisfy Proposition 3. If we do not
introduce a new red edge between a2 and a3, the grand coalition will be evaluated
during the traversal of the search tree, even if such coalition is guaranteed to
be temporally infeasible. On the other hand, the introduction of such red edge
avoids such ineﬃciency in our approach. Against this background, we can exploit
time constraints to restrict the formation of coalitions. We can also employ the
upper bound computation techniques discussed in Section 3.3.1, as we motivate
hereafter.
4.3. Bound computation
The upper bound methods proposed in Section 3.3.1 can also be applied when
we introduce time constraint, as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Propositions 1 and 2 are valid even if we substitute the deﬁni-
tion of v (S) in Equation 2 with the deﬁnition in Equation 10.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The techniques discussed so far (i.e., Sections 3 and 4) constitute our approach
to compute the optimal arrangement of cars among a set of agents with given
spatial, temporal, and social preferences. Formally, we discussed how we solve
the CSG problem associated to SR. In the next section, we tackle the problem
of dividing the cost associated to each car among its passengers in a fair and
stable way, i.e., we solve the payment computation aspect of the CF problem.
We now propose the PK algorithm, which exploits the structural properties of
the SR scenario to improve upon the approach by Shehory and Kraus [39].
5. Payments for SR
Payment computation represents a key challenge in the CF process and it is of
utmost importance when oﬀering ridesharing services, especially when consider-
ing commuters with rational behaviours. One key aspect of payment distribution
in CF is the game-theoretic concept of stability, which measures how agents are
32
Algorithm 4 ShehoryKrausKernel(x,CS, )
1: repeat
2: for all S ∈ CS do
3: for all ai ∈ S do
4: for all aj ∈ S − {ai} do
5: sij ← max{S′∈2A | ai∈S′,aj ∈S′} e (S′, x)
6: {ai∗ and aj∗ have the maximum surplus diﬀerence δ}
7: δ ← max(ai,aj)∈A2 (sij − sji)
8: (ai∗ , aj∗) ← argmax(ai,aj)∈A2 (sij − sji)
9: if x[j∗]− v ({aj∗}) < δ/2 then {Payments are individually rational}
10: d ← x[j∗]− v ({aj∗})
11: else
12: d ← δ/2
13: x[j∗] ← x[j∗]− d {Transfer payment from aj∗ ...}
14: x[i∗] ← x[i∗] + d {... to ai∗}
15: until δ/V (CS) ≤ 
keen to maintain the provided payments instead of deviating to a conﬁgura-
tion deemed to be more rewarding from their individual point of view. Here,
we induce stable payments in the context of the SR problem, employing the
kernel [14] stability concept. Shehory and Kraus [39] adopt a transfer scheme
(Algorithm 4) that represents the state of the art approach to compute kernel-
stable payments. Such an algorithm has been designed to compute payments
for CF scenarios in which the set of coalitions is not restricted by a graph. Such
an approach can be readily applied also when the size of coalitions is limited to
k members, as it happens in a SR scenario in which all cars have k seats [48].
Deﬁnition 18 (k-CF). A CF problem is said to be a k-CF problem if the size
of coalitions is limited to k members.
In k-CF, the maximisation at line 5 has to be assessed among the coalitions of
size up to k which include ai but exclude aj . This set, denoted as R, can be
easily obtained as R = {{ai} ∪ S | S is a h-combination of A − {ai, aj}, ∀h ∈
{1, . . . , k − 1}}. Unfortunately, in GCCF scenarios such as SR this simple ap-
proach would iterate over several infeasible coalitions (i.e., which do not in-
duce a connected subgraph of the social network), leading to ineﬃciency and
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reducing the scalability of the entire algorithm. In contrast, a better way to
tackle this problem is to exploit the structure of the graph in order to consider
only the coalitions that are indeed feasible. In addition, Algorithm 4 consid-
ers many coalitions more than once at the maximisation in the loop at lines
2–5. We provide the following example to clarify why this redundancy exists.
Consider the set of agent A = D = {a1, a2, a3, a4} and the graphG shown in Fig-
ure 7. Such a graph induces the set of feasible coalitions FC (G) = {{a1}, {a2},
{a3}, {a4}, {a1, a2}, {a1, a3}, {a1, a4}, {a1, a2, a3}, {a1, a2, a4}, {a1, a3, a4},
{a1, a2, a3, a4}}, and assumes a coalition structure CS = {{a1, a2, a3, a4}}.
a1 a2
a3 a4
Figure 7: Example of a social network with 4 agents.
The loop requires 12 iterations, each looking at the coalitions reported in Ta-
ble 1. Note that 23 (marked in bold) out of 33 coalitions (i.e., 70%) are evaluated
more than once. This process substantially reduces the eﬃciency and the scal-
ability of the algorithm in SR scenarios, where the computation cost required
to assess coalitional values is not negligible and caching is not an option. In
fact, storing all these values in memory is not aﬀordable even for systems with
hundreds of agents: since FC (G) can contain up to O (nk) coalitions, for k = 5
and n = 100, storing all coalitional values requires tens of GB of memory. Thus,
each coalitional value must be computed only when needed, since computing
them more than once reduces eﬃciency and scalability, as shown in Section 7.2.
To overcome these issues, in the next section we present the PK algorithm,
our payment scheme that scales up to systems with thousands of agents.
5.1. The PK algorithm
We now present the PK (Payments in the Kernel) algorithm, our method to
compute an -kernel payoﬀ allocation given a coalition structure, and we ap-
ply it to the SR scenario. Our contribution improves on the k-CF version of
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ai aj Coalitions
a1 a2 {a1} {a1, a3} {a1, a4} {a1, a3, a4}
a1 a3 {a1} {a1, a2} {a1, a4} {a1, a2, a4}
a1 a4 {a1} {a1, a2} {a1, a3} {a1, a2, a3}
a2 a1 {a2}
a2 a3 {a2} {a1, a2} {a1, a2, a4}
a2 a4 {a2} {a1, a2} {a1, a2, a3}
a3 a1 {a3}
a3 a2 {a3} {a1, a3} {a1, a3, a4}
a3 a4 {a3} {a1, a3} {a1, a2, a3}
a4 a1 {a4}
a4 a2 {a4} {a1, a4} {a1, a3, a4}
a4 a3 {a4} {a1, a4} {a1, a2, a4}
Table 1: Coalitions computed by the loop at lines 2–5 of Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 by adopting a novel approach to calculate the surplus matrix s.
Instead of computing each value sij using the maximisation at line 5 for each
pair of agents in each S ∈ CS, we iterate over the set of feasible coalitions (as
speciﬁed in Deﬁnition 5) induced by G, and we update the appropriate values
of the surplus matrix for each of such coalitions. Speciﬁcally, this is achieved by
iterating over the set of kˆ-subgraphs of G, i.e., the set of connected subgraphs
of G with at most k nodes, and then executing the update by means of the
UpdateMax routine only for those kˆ-subgraphs that actually correspond to
feasible coalitions. This additional check is mandatory since not all kˆ-subgraphs
necessarily satisfy Constraint 1, and hence, represent feasible coalitions. By so
doing, we ensure the exact coverage of FC (G), as proved by Proposition 6.
PK is detailed in Algorithm 5. After having initialised the payoﬀ vector x by
equally splitting each coalitional value among the members of the coalition,
ComputeMatrix computes the surplus matrix in each iteration of the main
loop. In such a routine, UpdateMax is executed for each coalition that induces
a kˆ-subgraph of G. These coalitions are computed with the EnumerateCsg
algorithm proposed by Moerkotte and Neumann [35], which can list all the sub-
graphs of a given graph without redundancy (i.e., each subgraph is computed
only once). Then, UpdateMax only considers the coalitions that satisfy Con-
straint 1 of the SR problem (line 1). For every S of such coalitions, lines 3–8
35
Algorithm 5 PK(CS, )
1: for all S ∈ CS do
2: for all ai ∈ S do
3: xi ← v(S)/|S| {Equally split coalitional value}
4: repeat
5: {Compute surplus matrix}
6: s ← ComputeMatrix (CS, x)
7: {ai∗ and aj∗ have the maximum surplus diﬀerence δ}
8: δ ← max(ai,aj)∈A2 (sij − sji)
9: (ai∗ , aj∗) ← argmax(ai,aj)∈A2 (sij − sji)
10: {Ensure that payments are individually rational}
11: if x[j∗]− v ({aj∗}) < δ/2 then
12: d ← x[j∗]− v ({aj∗})
13: else
14: d ← δ/2
15: x[j∗] ← x[j∗]− d {Transfer payment from aj∗ ...}
16: x[i∗] ← x[i∗] + d {... to ai∗}
17: until δ/v(CS) ≤ 
update all the values sij for which ai is a member of S and aj is part of S
′ (i.e.,
the coalition in CS that contains ai) but is not part of S. The correctness of
our approach is ensured by Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Algorithm 6 computes each sij correctly.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Our surplus matrix-calculating method has polynomial time complexity, while
computing all feasible coalitions only once, as shown by Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Algorithm 6 lists all feasible coalitions only once and it has a
worst-case time complexity of O
(
nk
)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Algorithm 6 ComputeMatrix(CS, x)
1: s ← −∞ {Initialise the entire matrix with −∞}
2: for all S that induce a kˆ-subgraph of G do
3: s ← UpdateMax (S,CS, s, x)
4: return s
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Algorithm 7 UpdateMax(S,CS, s, x)
1: if S satisﬁes Constraint 1 then
2: eS ← e (S, x) {Compute the excess of coalition S}
3: for all ai ∈ S do {For each agent ai in coalition S}
4: S′ ← the coalition in CS that contains ai
5: for all aj ∈ S′ − S do {For each aj ∈ S′ but ∈ S}
6: {sij is updated with the maximum between}
7: {its old value and the excess of coalition S}
8: sij ← max (sij , eS)
9: return s
In the next proposition, we prove that PK has a polynomial time complexity.
Proposition 7. Algorithm 5 has a polynomial worst-case time complexity with
respect to n, i.e., O
(− log2 () · nk+1
)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.
PK provides a polynomial method to compute kernel-stable payments. Nonethe-
less, the O
(
nk
)
operations required for surplus matrix calculation may not be
aﬀordable in real-world scenarios with thousands of agents and k = 5 (i.e., the
number of seats of an average sized car). Hence, we next propose a parallel
version of PK, which allows us to distribute the computational burden among
diﬀerent threads, taking advantage of modern multi-core hardware.
5.2. P-PK
We now detail P-PK, the parallel version of our approach, in which the most
computation-intensive task, i.e., the computation of the matrix s, is distributed
among T available threads. In particular, Algorithm 8 details our parallel version
of the ComputeMatrix routine, obtained by having each thread t to compute
a separate matrix st. Such a matrix is constructed considering the coalitions in
DIV (G, t, k), i.e., the tth fraction of the set of all kˆ-subgraphs of G, computed
using the D-SlyCE algorithm [45].17 Speciﬁcally, this fraction is obtained by
17Notice that nor EnumerateCsg neither D-SlyCE solve the payment computation prob-
lem, as they address the enumeration of the kˆ-subgraphs of G.
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splitting the ﬁrst generation of children nodes in the search tree generated by
the EnumerateCsg algorithm among the available threads, allowing a fair
division of the set of the kˆ-subgraphs while ensuring that all feasible coalitions
are computed exactly once. Thus, it also distributes the computation of the
coalitional values.
Algorithm 8 P-ComputeMatrix(CS, x, T )
1: s ← −∞ {Initialise all matrix elements with −∞}
2: for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T} do in parallel
3: for all S ∈ DIV (G, t, k) do
4: st ← UpdateMax (S,CS, st, x)
5: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do in parallel
6: for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} do in parallel
7: sij ← maxt∈{1,...,T} stij
8: return s
We provide the following example to clarify how this division is realised. Con-
sider the same FC (G) of the example in Section 5, and assume T = 4. Then,
the necessary coalitions are distributed by doing the following partitioning:
1. DIV (G, 1, k) = {{a1}, {a2}, {a3}}
2. DIV (G, 2, k) = {{a4}, {a1, a2}, {a1, a3}}
3. DIV (G, 3, k) = {{a1, a4}, {a1, a2, a3}}
4. DIV (G, 4, k) = {{a1, a2, a4}, {a1, a3, a4}}
Note that, since each matrix st is modiﬁed only by thread t, Algorithm 8 con-
tains only one synchronisation point (i.e., before line 5), hence providing a full
parallelisation. After that, the ﬁnal surplus matrix s is computed with a max-
imisation on all the above matrices (lines 5–7), ensuring that the output of
P-ComputeMatrix is equal to the one of ComputeMatrix, since each fea-
sible coalition in FC (G) has been computed by a thread. Notice that P-PK
requires storing t separate surplus matrices, one per thread. Hence, its memory
requirements are O
(
t · n2), i.e., still polynomial in the number of agents.
Having discussed our CF approach for the SR scenario, we now present our
experimental evaluation. In particular, in the next section we benchmark SR-
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CFSS, our algorithm that solves the GCCF aspect of SR. Then, in Section 7 we
empirically evaluate PK, our payment allocation algorithm.
6. Evaluating the SR-CFSS algorithm
The main goals of the empirical analysis are i) to estimate the social welfare
improvement when our SR model is used, ii) to evaluate the performance of the
optimal version of SR-CFSS in terms of runtime and scalability, iii) to evaluate
the approximate performance and guarantees that SR-CFSS can provide on a
large number of agents, i.e., up to 2000 agents, and iv) to investigate the impact
of time constraints on the above properties.
Since there are no publicly available datasets which include both spatial
and social data for the same users, in our empirical evaluation we consider
two separate real-world datasets and we superimpose the ﬁrst on the second
one. In particular, our map M = (P,Q) is a realistic representation of the
city of Beijing (Figure 8), with |P | = 8330 points and |Q| = 13290 edges,
equivalent to an average resolution of a point every ∼10 meters. This map has
been derived from the GeoLife dataset [34, 50] provided by Microsoft Research,
which comprises 17621 trajectories with a total distance of about 1.2 million
km, recorded by diﬀerent GPS loggers with a variety of sampling rates. These
trajectories are adopted to sample random paths used to provide starting points
and destinations. Moreover, such a dataset also includes the timestamp of each
trajectory, allowing us to create a distribution of the departure and arrival times
(Figure 9), which is used to sample such parameters for each agent in all our
experiments, unless otherwise stated (i.e., in all experiments considering time
constraints except Section 6.2). As expected, this distribution exhibit two peaks,
one in the morning from 7:00 to 9:00 and one in the evening from 17:00 to 19:00.
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Figure 8: The map of Beijing derived from the GeoLife dataset.
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Figure 9: Default distribution of departure/arrival times (obtained from GeoLife).
In each experiment, the graph G is a subgraph of a large crawl of the Twitter
social graph. Speciﬁcally, such dataset is a graph with 41.6 million nodes and
1.4 billion edges published as part of the work by Kwak et al. [30]. In particular,
G is obtained by means of a standard algorithm [37] to extract a subgraph
from a larger graph, i.e., a breadth-ﬁrst traversal starting from a random node
of the whole graph, adding each node and the corresponding arcs to G, until
the desired number of nodes is reached. In our empirical evaluation there is no
mapping between the trajectory data and the social graph, since they belong to
independent projects. In all our experiments, the default number of agents n is
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50. We adopt a cost model that considers fuel expenses, i.e., v (C) = Kfuel ·L∗C ,
where L∗C represents the length of L
∗
C in km, Kfuel = −0.06 e/km (considering
a fuel cost of −1 e per litre and an average consumption of 1 litre of fuel every
15 km) and k ({ai}) = −3 e ∀ai ∈ A, which represents the average public
transportation cost, i.e., a bus or a train ticket. Moreover, we assume that each
car has a capacity of 5 seats, i.e., seats (ai) = 5∀ai ∈ D. When time constraints
are considered, we deﬁne γ = −2 e/h and a time window (i.e., the duration
of θi) of 30’, unless otherwise stated. All our tests account for Constraint 2
(drivers always drive their cars). Hence, since both bounding techniques detailed
in Section 3.3.1 are valid and, in general, one does not dominate on the other,
we take the minimum one at each step of the algorithm, providing a more
eﬀective pruning. Each test is repeated on 20 random instances, and we report
the average and the standard error of the mean. SR-CFSS is implemented in
C18 and executed on a machine with a 3.40GHz CPU and 16 GB of memory.
6.1. Social welfare improvement without time constraints
In our ﬁrst experiment we consider the improvement of the social welfare (i.e.,
the cost reduction for the overall system) when using our SR model without
time constraints, compared to the scenario in which every rider adopts its own
conveyance (i.e., no ridesharing). This gives an indication of what gain can
be achieved by the overall community when using our system for ridesharing.
Formally, we deﬁne the social welfare improvement as 100 ·
∣∣∣V (CS∗)−V (Asingle)V (Asingle)
∣∣∣ .
Such an improvement is inﬂuenced by the percentage of drivers in the system
(Figure 10), which determines the number of available seats and the number
of riders that can share a ride without having to resort to public transport.
Moreover, with more drivers it is more probable that a rider can join a car whose
path is closer to him/her. On the other hand, if the majority of the riders own a
car (i.e., > 80%), ridesharing is not very eﬀective since too few riders without a
car can beneﬁt from sharing their commutes with a driver. In particular, when
18Our implementation is available at https://github.com/filippobistaffa/SR-CFSS.
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only the 10% of the total riders own a car, the average cost reduction is −23.49%,
reaching −36.22% when half of the riders owns a car. To show the importance
of an optimal approach, we benchmark our algorithm against a greedy one, in
which every driver chooses its next stop as the closest among the destinations
points of his current passengers and the starting points of the remaining riders.
This choice is made considering the constraints imposed by the social network,
avoiding the formation of infeasible coalitions. As Figure 10 shows, our method
allows superior cost reductions with respect to such a greedy approach, which
can provide a maximum improvement of −19.55% for |D| = 20%. Notice that,
when the majority of the riders owns a car, the greedy approach cannot improve
upon the value of the baseline (i.e., no ridesharing).
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Figure 10: Social welfare improvement.
6.2. Social welfare improvement with time constraints
We now investigate how the social welfare improvement varies when we intro-
duce time constraints. Speciﬁcally, we now study the inﬂuence of the duration
of θi (i.e., the width of the time window) and the distribution of the agents’ de-
parture times on the social welfare. To this end, we vary these two parameters
as follows. On the one hand, we sample the departure times of the agents within
a time window of 6 hours according to 3 probability distributions (Figure 11).
Speciﬁcally, we consider a uniform distribution (i.e., the departure times are
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distributed uniformly in the time window) and two Gaussian distributions, in
which the agents who desire to leave in the two central hours of the time window
are the 30% (soft peak) and the 40% (hard peak) of the total respectively. On
the other hand, we vary the width of the time window θi for each agent. For sim-
plicity, we assume that ασi = β
σ
i = α
ω
i = β
ω
i are all equal for all agents, and we
vary such value, namely θi’s radius, within [5
′, 60′]. Following the result of the
experiments in the previous section, we only consider D = 50%, i.e., the scenario
that results in the highest social welfare improvement. Figure 12 shows that,
in general, the social welfare improvement increases when we increase the θi’s
radius. In fact, with larger time windows it is easier to satisfy time constraints
and, hence, to form coalitions to reduce the overall travel cost. Notice that such
an improvement saturates when the radius exceeds 30 minutes, since larger θi’s
radii are associated to larger costs by the θC component, which contributes
to reduce the social welfare improvement. In addition, Figure 12 also shows
that the hard peak distribution provides the highest social welfare improvement
(8.79%) with respect to the soft peak (6.62%) and the uniform (3.62%) ones. In
fact, if the departure times of more agents are concentrated in a shorter time
period, the cost provided by the θC component is lower. Moreover, SR-CFSS
can evaluate a larger number of feasible solutions, since less temporally infea-
sible coalition structures have to be discarded. Finally, notice that, since time
constraints result in additional costs and, more important, a reduced solution
space, they cause a reduction of the social welfare improvement, as conﬁrmed
by the results in Section 6.4.
We further investigate the behaviour of the social welfare improvement by in-
creasing the θi’s radius only of a particular class of commuters, in order to
identify which classes are more sensitive to the variation of such parameter in
terms of overall cost reduction. Speciﬁcally, we observe 3 interesting classes of
agents, i.e., drivers, riders, and hubs (i.e., agents whose connectivity in the so-
cial graph is signiﬁcantly above the average), and we vary the θi’s radius within
[15′, 60′] only for the considered class, while setting such parameter equal to 15′
for the other classes.
43
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Time window hours
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
a
g
en
ts
(%
)
Uniform
Soft peak
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
Hard peak
Figure 11: Probability distributions in a time window of 6 hours.
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Figure 12: Social welfare improvement with respect to θi’s radius.
Figure 13 shows that the social welfare improvement has the biggest increase
for the drivers (+6.28%), reaching a ﬁnal maximum of 14.24%. Such increase is
slightly lower for hubs (+5.1%), while it is only +1.27% for riders. These results
prove the impact of a larger θi’s radius for drivers and hubs, which results
in a larger number of potential coalitions, and, hence, a larger social welfare
improvement.
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Figure 13: Social welfare improvement with respect to θi’s radius.
6.3. Runtime performance without time constraints
In this section we discuss the performance of our approach in terms of run-
time needed to compute the optimal solution of a SR problem without time
constraints. Figure 14 shows the runtime with respect to the number of agents
adopting our SR model without time constraints. Our approach is tested in 3
scenarios, i.e., with low (10%), medium (50%) and high (80%) percentage of
drivers, showing that this parameter has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the perfor-
mance of our algorithm. In fact, the size of the search space is determined by
the number of available seats (reduced when such a percentage is low) and the
number of riders without a car who can beneﬁt from sharing their commutes
(reduced when the majority of the agents owns a car), consistently with the
behaviour of the social welfare improvement detailed in the previous section.
Notice that, in any case, our approach can solve systems with 100 agents in
a reasonable amount of time, i.e., about 2 hours at most for |D| = 50%. This
runtime is suitable for services with day-ahead or week-ahead requests (e.g.,
Lyft). Such a performance is possible thanks to our bounding techniques (see
Section 3.3.1) that allow to prune a signiﬁcant part of the search space. In more
detail, such techniques allow an average pruning of the 97.5% of the search space
(resulting in an average runtime improvement of about 4 hours) on 20 random
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Figure 14: Runtime without time constraints.
instances with n = 60 and |D| = 50%.
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Figure 15: Runtime with time constraints.
6.4. Runtime performance with time constraints
When we consider time constraints (Figure 15), we notice a signiﬁcant perfor-
mance improvement of SR-CFSS, which can compute the optimal solution for
100 agents in 30 seconds, i.e., over two orders of magnitude faster than the above
case. This improved performance also results in an increased scalability, as SR-
CFSS can solve systems with 150 agents, i.e., 50 additional agents with respect
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Figure 16: Runtime with respect to θi’s radius.
to 100 agents in the previous experiment, in the same amount of time, and 200
in less than a day. We further investigate the impact of time constraints on the
performance of SR-CFSS by varying the θi’s radius, as discussed in Section 6.2.
Figure 16 shows that larger radii correspond to harder SR problems. As an ex-
ample, instances with a θi’s radius equal to 15 minutes are solved by SR-CFSS
more than two orders of magnitude faster with respect to when we consider 45
minutes. As discussed in Section 6.2, larger radii correspond to a larger number
of feasible solutions, since fewer temporally infeasible coalition structures have
to be discarded. These results conﬁrm the impact of time constraints on the
dimension of the solution space, which results in two main outcomes. On the
one hand, scenarios with time constraints are easier to solve, since the number
of solutions is lower. On the other hand, the reduced number of solutions allows
a lower social welfare improvement in such scenarios (see Section 6.2).
6.5. Approximate performance
In this section we evaluate the quality of the solutions computed by the approx-
imate version of SR-CFSS on a very large set of agents (i.e., 2000). A standard
measure to evaluate the quality of the solutions of approximate algorithms is
the Performance Ratio (PR) [3].
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Deﬁnition 19 (PR). Given an instance I of an optimisation problem, its op-
timal solution Optim (I) and an approximate solution Approx (I), the perfor-
mance ratio PR (I) = max
(
Approx(I)
Optim(I) ,
Optim(I)
Approx(I)
)
.
Both in the case of minimisation and maximisation problems, the PR is equal to
1 in the case of an optimal solution, and can assume arbitrarily large values in the
case of poor approximate solutions. In our case, computing the optimal solution
Optim (I) for large-scale GCCF problems is not possible, hence the PR is not
an applicable measure of quality. Thus, we deﬁne the Maximum Performance
Ratio (MPR) following the above deﬁnition, and considering the upper bound
on the optimal solution provided by Propositions 1 and 2.
Deﬁnition 20 (MPR). Given a GCCF instance I, we denote the approximate
solution computed by CFSS as Approx (I) and the upper bound on the opti-
mal solution as Bound (I). Then, we deﬁne the Maximum Performance Ratio
MPR (I) = max
(
Approx(I)
Bound(I) ,
Bound(I)
Approx(I)
)
.
Since |Bound (I) | ≤ |V (CS∗I ) |, where CS∗I is the optimal solution of I,MPR (I)
represents an upper bound for PR (I). The MPR provides an important qual-
ity guarantee for the approximate solution Approx (I), since Approx (I) always
lies within a factor of MPR (I) with respect to the optimal solution.19 We
run SR-CFSS on instances adopting the model without time constraints with
n ∈ {500, 1000, 2000} and we stop the execution after a time budget of 100 sec-
onds. Then, we compute Bound (I) as deﬁned in Propositions 1 and 2. Speciﬁ-
cally, since both propositions are applicable, we compute the upper bound using
both techniques and then we consider the lowest one. Figure 17 shows that,
on average, Bound (I) is only 6.65% higher than Approx (I) (i.e., the solution
found within the time limit) for n = 500 and |D| = 80%, reaching a maximum of
+29.92% when n = 2000 and |D| = 50%. In the worst case, SR-CFSS provides
a maximum performance ratio of 1.41 and thus solutions whose values are at
19PR and MPR provide a per-instance quality guarantee, in contrast with the approximation
ratio [12] that provide a quality guarantee valid for all possible instances.
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Figure 17: Maximum performance ratio of approximate solutions.
least 71% of the optimal. We obtained very similar results also when we consider
time constraints, and hence, we do not report them here. Such a behaviour is
reasonable since the maximum performance ratio is heavily inﬂuenced by the
value of Bound (I) and, as detailed in Section 4.3, we apply the same technique
whether or not we consider time constraints.
6.6. SR-CFSS vs. C-Link: solution quality comparison
In our ﬁnal experiment we further evaluate the approximate performance of
SR-CFSS by comparing it against C-Link [21], one of the most recent CSG
heuristic approaches. Speciﬁcally, we generate random SR instances with n ∈
{1000, 1200, . . . , 2000}, considering 20 repetitions for each n. Then, we solve
each instance with C-Link (adopting the best heuristic proposed by Farinelli
et al. [21], i.e., Gain-Link) and then we run SR-CFSS on the same instance with
a time budget equal to C-Link’s runtime.
Figure 18 shows the average and the standard error of the mean of the ratio
between the value of the solution computed by C-Link and the one computed
by SR-CFSS. Since we consider solutions with negative values, when such ratio
is > 1 the solution computed by C-Link is better (i.e., corresponds to a lower
cost) than the one computed by SR-CFSS. Our results show that, for n < 1600,
the quality of C-Link’s solutions is better than SR-CFSS. Then, for n ≥ 1600
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Figure 18: Ratio between C-Link and SR-CFSS approximate solutions.
SR-CFSS outperforms C-Link in terms of solution quality. In particular, for
n = 2000 the solutions provided by our approach correspond to costs that are,
on average, 2.28 times lower than the counterpart ones.
6.7. Summary of results
Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that our approach results in a signiﬁcant
cost reduction when applied to SR scenarios, reaching −36.22% when half of
the agents in the system owns a car. Such a scenario, resulting in the best cost
improvement, is characterised by the largest search space, i.e., it is the most
computationally intensive to solve with respect to other percentages of drivers.
As expected, the introduction of time constraints reduces the cost improvement
for the system, since it limits the number of possible solutions, reducing the
size of the search space. As a consequence, computing SR solutions with time
constraints is less computationally demanding. Crucially, results show that SR-
CFSS is a viable method for the computation of SR solutions, especially in
large-scale scenarios (i.e., with 2000 agents), where our approach provides good
approximate solutions whose quality is at least 71% of the optimal.
After the empirical evaluation of SR-CFSS, we now benchmark PK.
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7. Evaluating the PK algorithm
In this section, we focus on the evaluation of our approach to the computation of
kernel-stable payments for SR. The main goals of the empirical analysis are i) to
test the performance of PK when computing payments for systems of thousands
of agents, ii) to perform an analysis of the features that inﬂuence the distribution
of payments among the agents, iii) to investigate the impact of time constraints
on the above properties, iii) to compare the eﬃciency of PK with respect to the
state of the art approach proposed by Shehory and Kraus, and iv) to estimate
the speed-up obtainable by using P-PK with respect to PK.
In all our tests, we adopt the same methodology and datasets discussed in
Section 6 (i.e., we adopt the GeoLife and Twitter datasets), unless otherwise
stated. In the experiments looking at the performance of PK (i.e., Sections 7.1,
7.2 and 7.3) we only consider the SR model without time constraints, since the
performance of PK is negligibly aﬀected by them.20 PK is implemented in C21
and executed on a machine with a 3.40GHz CPU and 16 GB of memory.
7.1. Runtime performance
In our ﬁrst experiment, we evaluate the performance of our approach when com-
puting payments in large-scale instances. Figure 19 shows the runtime needed
to execute P-PK on systems with n ∈ {100, 500, 1000, 1500, 2000}. In each test,
the coalition structure has been computed using the approximate version of
SR-CFSS using our SR model without time constraints.
Our results show that P-PK is able to compute payments for 2000 agents
with a runtime ranging from 13 to 50 minutes, hence it can successfully scale to
large systems. In particular, for each value of n, we consider |D| ∈ {10%, 50%, 80%}.
Our results also show the inﬂuence of the percentage of drivers on the complexity
of the problem. On average, computing payments on an instance with |D| = 80%
is easier with respect to |D| = 10% and |D| = 50%. Our ﬁndings are consistent
20The complexity of computing each coalitional value is comparable whether or not we
consider time constraints.
21Our implementation is available at https://github.com/filippobistaffa/PK.
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with the results in Section 6.1, showing that the scenario with |D| = 50% is
more diﬃcult to solve since more drivers are available, hence it is possible to
form more cars, resulting in a larger search space. In fact, the number of feasible
coalitions is determined by the number of available seats (reduced when such a
percentage is low) and the number of riders without a car who can beneﬁt from
sharing their commutes (reduced when the majority of the agents owns a car).
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Figure 19: Runtime needed to compute payments.
7.2. Benchmarking PK
Figure 20 shows the runtime needed by our approach to compute a kernel-stable
payoﬀ vector, comparing it with the state of the art approach by Shehory and
Kraus [39], i.e., Algorithm 4. In particular, we consider the runtime needed to
solve SR instances with n ∈ {30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100} and |D| = 50%. We
employ the sequential version of PK, since Algorithm 4 is also sequential.
Our results show that PK is at least one order of magnitude faster than the
counterpart approach, outperforming the state of the art by 27 times in the worst
case, with an average improvement of 53 times, and a best case improvement of
84 times. Thus, our comparison has been run only up to n = 100, since the coun-
terpart approach becomes impractical for instances with thousands of agents.
In fact, with 1000 agents it requires over one day of computation, compared
to a runtime of 2 hours required by PK, and 14 minutes required by P-PK. In
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particular, the approach in [39] is slower due to several redundant computations
of many coalitional values, with a signiﬁcant impact on the runtime.
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Figure 20: Runtime needed to compute payments.
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Figure 21: Multi-threading speed-up.
7.3. Parallel performance
Here we analyse the speed-up that can be achieved by using P-PK with respect
to PK, i.e., its sequential version. We ran the algorithms on instances with 500
agents and |D| = 50%, using a machine with 2 Intel R© Xeon R© E5-2420.
The speed-up measured during these tests has been compared with the maxi-
mum theoretical one provided by the Amdahl’s Law [2], considering an estimated
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non-parallelisable part of 1%, due to memory allocation and thread initialisa-
tion. Figure 21 shows that the actual speed-up follows the theoretical one for
up to 12 threads (i.e., the number of physical cores for this machine), reaching
a ﬁnal speed-up of 14.85× with all 24 threads active.
7.4. Costs and network centrality
PK computes a cost allocation that is guaranteed to be kernel-stable. A priori,
such an allocation does not have any particular property linked with structure
of the problem. The purpose of this section is to analyse the relationship be-
tween the cost incurred by a commuter and the properties that determine its
importance in the environment, i.e., being a node with a high degree in the so-
cial network, or being driver or rider. To this end, we ﬁrst compute the optimal
solution of a SR problem without time constraints on random instances with
n ∈ {30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100} and |D| ∈ {10%, 50%, 80%}, and we use our
algorithm to compute a kernel-stable payoﬀ vector. Then, to assess this correla-
tion in a quantiﬁed manner, we deﬁne the normalised cost ci and the normalised
degree di for each agent ai as follows:
• For any ai in a coalition S with |S| > 1, we deﬁne its normalised cost ci
as
ci =
−x[i]−minSx
maxSx −minSx
,
where minSx and max
S
x are the minimum and the maximum values of the
negative values of x among the members of S, i.e., minSx = minai∈S −x[i]
and maxSx = maxai∈S −x[i]. Note that we consider negative values since
in our model, costs are represented by negative values for x[i].
• For any ai in a coalition S with |S| > 1, we deﬁne its normalised degree
di as
di =
deg (ai)−minSd
maxSd −minSd
,
where deg (ai) is the degree of ai in the social network, and min
S
d and
maxSd are the minimum and the maximum degrees of the members of S.
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When the denominator of ci is 0, i.e, when max
S
x = min
S
x , it means that all the
agents in C have the same payoﬀ. In these cases, ci is deﬁned to be 0.5 as a
middle point between 0 and 1 (the same discussion applies to di).
Notice that, a direct comparison of two agents that are not part of the
same coalition would not be appropriate for determining their overall power or
beneﬁts derived from participation in the SR setting, since payments computed
according to the kernel do not consider agents belonging to diﬀerent coalitions.
Nonetheless, it would deﬁnitely be interesting to have a way to measure and
compare the power of the agents, regardless of the coalition to which each one
belongs. To allow this comparison, both ci and di are normalised between 0 (for
the agents having the minimum costs/degrees in their coalitions) and 1 (similarly
for the agents with maximum costs/degrees). The normalisation is done with
respect to the coalition the agent belongs to, because to reach kernel-stability,
payment transfers only take place among agents within the same coalition. As
an example, if an agent’s normalised cost is 0.4, it means that its incurred
cost is a value placed at the 40% of the range between the minimum and the
maximum costs incurred by the agents in its coalition. Finally, note that agents
in singletons have been excluded, as they do not have to split their value.
In Figure 22 we report the average and the standard error of the mean for
the normalised cost with respect to the normalised degree. Our results clearly
show that costs are strongly inﬂuenced by the degree of the agents, and whether
they are drivers or riders. Speciﬁcally, in our tests drivers had to pay costs that
were on average 16% lower than riders. Moreover, agents with the minimum
number of social connections in their coalition (i.e., with a normalised degree of
0) paid a cost 171% higher than the ones with the highest degree.
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Figure 22: Normalised cost w.r.t. normalised degree without time constraints.
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Figure 23: Normalised cost with respect to normalised degree with time constraints.
We now investigate how the features of the cost distributions studied above are
aﬀected by the introduction of time constraints. Figure 23 shows a behaviour
similar to the one discussed in the above section. Moreover, we notice that the
introduction of time constraints results in signiﬁcantly lower costs for the drivers
(i.e., drivers pay costs that are on average 35% lower than the previous exper-
iment), while riders’ costs are comparable in both scenarios. These results can
be explained by recalling that time constraints signiﬁcantly reduce the solution
space (see Sections 6.2 and 6.4), and hence, the inﬂuence of drivers (who are
56
crucial to determine whether or not a coalition can be formed) is stronger if the
pool of possible alternative coalitions is smaller.
We further investigate the role of time constraints in the payment distribu-
tion process by studying to what extent more tolerant agents are rewarded with
lower costs. To this end, we assign a random θi’s radius within {5′, 10′, 15′, 20′,
25′, 30′} to each agent and we look at the corresponding normalised cost. Fig-
ure 24 shows that the agents that are willing to tolerate more with respect to
their ideal departure/leaving time are rewarded by the system with lower costs,
as a consequence of the fact that, by having a larger θi’s radius, they can choose
among a larger pool of alternatives and hence, they achieve a higher bargaining
power in the payment distribution process.
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Figure 24: Normalised cost with respect to θi’s radius
7.5. Summary of results
In general, our experimental results suggest that the kernel can be a valid sta-
bility concept in the context of SR. In fact, it induces a reasonable behaviour
in the formation of groups, which can be directly correlated with some simple
properties of the agents in the system (i.e., network centrality and being a driver
or a rider). Moreover, the computation of kernel-stable payments has a tractable
complexity and hence, it is a viable approach for large-scale environments.
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8. Conclusions
In this work, we showed how the social ridesharing (SR) problem can be mod-
elled as a GCCF problem extending the state of the art algorithm for GCCF,
i.e., CFSS, to solve it. Our empirical evaluation shows that our approach can
lead to a cost reduction for the entire system that reaches the −36.22% and
that our approximate technique can compute solutions for very large systems
(i.e., up to 2000 agents) with good quality guarantees (i.e., with a MPR of 1.41
in the worst case). Furthermore, we tackled the payment computation aspect
associated to SR, by proposing PK, the ﬁrst approach able to compute kernel-
stable payments for systems with thousands of agents. PK is able to compute
payments for 2000 agents in less than an hour and it is 84 times faster than the
state of the art in the best case. Finally, we identify a relationship between the
ability of an agent to obtain a high payment and its degree in the social graph.
Future work will look at extending our approach by focusing on the devel-
opment of an online SR system, motivated by the inherent dynamic nature of
realistic ridesharing systems. In this perspective, we aim at the design of a SR
model in which agents can join and leave the system over an extended amount of
time. Such a scenario suggests a solution scheme that employs an oﬄine method
(e.g., SR-CFSS) at each time step, which possibly adopts heuristics to restrict
solutions only to local areas. Myopic, short-sighted solutions are then avoided
by estimating future mobility patterns for the agents, which could be inferred
by the history of previous requests. A further research direction could consider
multi-hop ridesharing [19] (not currently used by most existing ridesharing ser-
vices) for journeys outside the urban scenario. Finally, in the context of payment
computation, we aim at investigating whether recent tractability results on par-
ticular network structures [23] could also be applied to the SR scenario.
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Appendix A. Proofs of propositions
Proposition 1. If Constraint 2 holds, for any feasible coalition structure CS
M1 (CS) =
∑
S∈Ad(CS)
v (S)
is an upper bound for the value of any CS′ in ST (CS), i.e., the subtree rooted
in CS. Formally, M1 (CS) ≥ V (CS′) for all CS′ ∈ ST (CS) .
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose there exists a coalition structure CS′ ∈ ST (CS)
such that V (CS′) > M1 (CS), i.e., CS′ results in a cost lower13 than M1 (CS).
Now, since CS′ ∈ ST (CS) and Constraint 2 holds, CS′ must have been formed
by adding single riders to already formed cars in CS. All such cars correspond
to coalitions whose values are lower than the original ones, since the addition of
a single rider cannot reduce the cost. This contradicts V (CS′) > M1 (CS).
Lemma 1. Given a feasible coalition structure CS and a coalition structure
CS′ ∈ ST (CS) such that V (CS′) > M2 (CS), then
∃S′ ∈ Ad (CS′) : v (S′) > 1
2
·
∑
ai∈S′
m (ai) . (A.1)
Proof. By contradiction. First notice that
V (CS′) = V (Ad (CS′)) + V (CS′ \Ad (CS′)) ,
i.e., V (CS′) is the sum of the values of all the cars in CS′ plus the values of the
singletons of riders that are not drivers. From V (CS′) > M2 (CS), it follows
that
V (Ad (CS
′)) + V (CS′ \Ad (CS′)) > 1
2
·
∑
ai∈Ud(CS)
m (ai) .
Since V (CS′ \Ad (CS′)) =
∑
S∈Ad(CS′) k (S) ≤ 0 (Equation 2), it follows that
V (Ad (CS
′)) >
1
2
·
∑
ai∈Ud(CS)
m (ai) .
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Since we only merge coalitions in the formation of new coalition structures in
ST (CS), it is impossible that a rider exits a car, i.e., Ud (CS) ⊆ Ud (CS′).
Moreover, since the function m (·) is negative (see Deﬁnition 15), it is also true
that
V (Ad (CS
′)) >
1
2
·
∑
ai∈Ud(CS′)
m (ai) . (A.2)
Now, suppose that (A.1) is not true, i.e., v (S′) ≤ 12 ·
∑
ai∈S′ m (ai) , ∀S′ ∈
Ad (CS
′) . If we apply such property to all the coalitions S′ considered in the
summation
∑
S′∈Ad(CS′) v (S
′) = V (CS′) , we obtain
V (Ad (CS
′)) ≤ 1
2
·
∑
ai∈Ud(CS′)
m (ai) ,
which contradicts (A.2).
Proposition 2. If Assumption 1 holds, for any feasible coalition structure CS
M2 (CS) is an upper bound for the value of any CS
′ in ST (CS), i.e., the subtree
rooted in CS. Formally, M2 (CS) ≥ V (CS′) for all CS′ ∈ ST (CS) .
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose there exists a coalition structure CS′ ∈ ST (CS)
such that V (CS′) > M2 (CS). By applying Lemma 1, there exists S′∈Ad (CS′)
such that v (S′) > 12 ·
∑
ai∈S′ m (ai) . Since Assumption 1 holds, it follows that
value (concat (L∗S′)) >
1
2
·
∑
ai∈S′
m (ai) , (A.3)
for some L∗S′ ∈ VT (S′) . Now, value (·) is additive (Deﬁnition 7), thus it can be
seen as the sum of the costs of all the subpaths that form concat (L∗S′) . Formally,
value (concat (L∗S′)) =
∑|L∗
S′ |−1
k=1
value (sp (L∗S′ [k], L
∗
S′ [k + 1])) . (A.4)
By combining (A.3) and (A.4) we obtain
∑|L∗S′ |−1
k=1
value (sp (L∗S′ [k], L
∗
S′ [k + 1])) >
1
2
·
∑
ai∈S′
m (ai) . (A.5)
Now, it is easy to see that the cost provided by
∑
ai∈S′ m (ai) cannot be higher
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than twice22 the cost of any valid path that goes through the starting points
and destinations of the members of S′. It follows that 12 ·
∑
ai∈S′ m (ai) cannot
be lower than the corresponding value (·) for any of such valid paths, since we
consider negative cost functions. This contradicts (A.5).
Proposition 3. Let ai, aj ∈ A with ai ∈ D and aj ∈ D. If we consider Con-
straint 2 (i.e., one driver per car) and [τσj + β
σ
j , τ
ω
j − αωj ] ⊆ [τσi − ασi , τωi + βωi ],
then ai and aj can never be in a time feasible coalition together, i.e., ∀S ∈
FC (G) : {ai, aj} ⊆ S, S is a time infeasible coalition.
Proof. If [τσj +β
σ
i , τ
ω
j −αωj ] ⊆ [τσi −ασi , τωi +βωi ], then τσj +βσi <τσi −ασi or τωj −αωj
>τωi +β
ω
i . Intuitively, aj ’s latest departure time is earlier than ai’s earliest de-
parture time or aj ’s earliest arriving time is later than ai’s latest arriving time.
Since we consider Constraint 2, ai can be the only driver of any coalition con-
taining both ai and aj . Thus, it is trivial to verify that the above time constraint
will always be violated, since travelling back in time is not (yet) possible.
Proposition 4. Propositions 1 and 2 are valid even if we substitute the deﬁni-
tion of v (S) in Equation 2 with the deﬁnition in Equation 10.
Proof. Given a coalition S ∈ FC (G), the value provided by v (S) in Equation 2
is necessarily greater than the one provided by Equation 10, since the latter
is equal to the former with the addition of θS (L
∗
S , τ
∗
S), which is negative by
deﬁnition. Notice that the t (L∗S) + c (L
∗
S) + f (L
∗
S) is exactly the same, since
we make Assumption 1 in both cases, and we assess L∗S in the same way. As
a consequence, given a feasible coalition structure CS, V (CS) is greater if we
consider Equation 2 with respect to Equation 10. Therefore, since Propositions 1
and 2 provide upper bounds and are valid considering Equation 2, they are also
valid with Equation 10.
Proposition 5. Algorithm 6 computes each sij correctly.
22If we sum all the values of the couples of edges incident to the points that form a given
path, we consider each edge twice.
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Proof. Once the loop has ended, each sij stores the maximum excess among all
feasible coalitions with ai but without aj , with both ai and aj part of the same
coalition in CS. This matches line 5 of Algorithm 4.
Proposition 6. Algorithm 6 lists all feasible coalitions only once and it has a
worst-case time complexity of O
(
nk
)
.
Proof. Algorithm 6 lists all kˆ-subgraph of G exactly once [45]. Note that the
number of kˆ-subgraphs is O
(
nk
)
, since we only consider coalitions with up
to k members [39]. Hence, Algorithm 6 makes at most O
(
nk
)
calls to Up-
dateMax. Finally, note that the time complexity of UpdateMax is constant
with respect to n, since computing e (S, x) requires the computation of v (S)
(which has constant time complexity), and the loop at lines 3–8 requires O
(
k2
)
iterations. Moreover, UpdateMax only considers coalitions that satisfy Con-
straint 1 (whose check is constant with respect to n) and it computes each
coalitional value only once at line 2. Thus, Algorithm 6 computes all feasible
coalitions only once and its worst-case time complexity is O
(
nk
)
.
Proposition 7. Algorithm 5 has a polynomial worst-case time complexity with
respect to n, i.e., O
(− log2 () · nk+1
)
.
Proof. Here we refer to equations and lemmas provided by Stearns [41]. Each
iteration of Algorithm 5 identiﬁes the agents ai and aj with the maximum sur-
plus diﬀerence δ = sij − sij , performing a transfer of size d from aj to ai. Thus,
by Lemma 1 [41], in the following iteration these surpluses will be s′ij = sij − d
and s′ji = sji + d. Notice that s
′
ij − s′ji = sij − sji − 2 · d = δ − 2 · d. Now, by
deﬁnition of d (lines 11–14 of Algorithm 5), d ≤ δ/2, hence s′ij − s′ji ≥ 0. There-
fore, we can aﬃrm that the transfer from aj to ai is indeed a K-transfer, since
it satisﬁes Equation 4, 5, 6 and 7 [41]. Lemma 2 [41] ensures the convergence
of Algorithm 2, by aﬃrming that a K-transfer cannot increase the larger sur-
pluses in the system. Speciﬁcally, in the next iteration the diﬀerence between
the surpluses between aj to ai will be half of what was in the previous one.
After λ iterations, its value will be 1
2λ
of the original one. Thus, it will take
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λ = log2([
δ0/v(CS)]/) iterations to ensure that [δ0/v(CS)]/2λ ≤ , with δ0 being the
original maximum sij surplus. Since we have n agents into the setting, it will
take λ·n = O (− log2 () · n) iterations to convergence. Then, we know by Propo-
sition 2 that ComputeMatrix, which dominates the time complexity of each
iteration, has a worst-case time complexity of O
(
nk
)
. Given this, Algorithm 2
has a worst-case time complexity of O
(− log2 () · nk+1
)
.
Appendix B. Existence of the core in the SR scenario
As introduced in Section 2.2, the core [10] is a very strong stability concept,
whose computation has an exponential time complexity with respect to the
number of agents. An in-depth discussion of the complexity aspects of core-
related problems is provided by Chalkiadakis et al. [11].
Due to its strength, the core is not guaranteed to be always non-empty, i.e.,
it is not always possible to compute a core-stable payment allocation. Consider
the following SR instance, which, for simplicity, does not take into account time
constraints. Such instance has been generated from the datasets discussed in
Section 6. Let G be the graph in Figure B.25. The only driver is agent a5.
Consider the following coalitional values (only feasible coalitions are reported):
v ({a0}) = 3.00e, v ({a1}) = 3.00e, v ({a2}) = 3.00e, v ({a3}) = 3.00e,
v ({a4}) = 3.00e, v ({a5}) = 2.02e, v ({a5, a2}) = 3.13e,
v ({a5, a2, a4}) = 3.19e, v ({a5, a0, a2}) = 3.84e, v ({a5, a0, a2, a3}) = 3.99e,
v ({a5, a0, a2, a4}) = 4.11e, v ({a5, a0, a2, a3, a4}) = 4.41e,
v ({a5, a1}) = 3.76e, v ({a5, a1, a4}) = 3.85e, v ({a5, a0, a1}) = 5.01e,
v ({a5, a1, a3}) = 4.68e, v ({a5, a1, a3, a4}) = 4.81e,
v ({a5, a0, a1, a4}) = 5.13e, v ({a5, a0, a1, a3}) = 5.18e,
v ({a5, a0, a1, a3, a4}) = 5.30e, v ({a5, a1, a2}) = 4.85e,
v ({a5, a1, a2, a4}) = 4.94e, v ({a5, a0, a1, a2}) = 5.61e,
v ({a5, a1, a2, a3}) = 5.46e, v ({a5, a1, a2, a3, a4}) = 5.59e,
v ({a5, a0, a1, a2, a4}) = 5.73e, v ({a5, a0, a1, a2, a3}) = 5.78e.
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Figure B.25: Example of a social network with 6 agents.
The optimal coalition structure in the above instance is CS∗ = {{a5, a0, a2,
a3, a4}, {a1}}. We implemented a Linear Programming (LP) algorithm23 that
computes a core-stable payment allocation, if it exists. Using such an algorithm,
we determined that the core is empty in the above instance.
We ran further experiments to evaluate the percentage of instances that
have an empty core in the SR scenario. Figure B.26 shows such a percentage,
considering 60 SR instances generated from our datasets for each n. Our results
show that, most of the times, the core is empty in the SR scenario, in contrast
with the kernel, which always exists. Speciﬁcally, the core is empty in the 75%
of the instances with 13 agents or more. More important, our results conﬁrm
that, as expected, the number of instances with an empty core increases when
we increase the number of agents. Henceforth, the core is not a viable stability
concept for large-scale SR problems we are interested to tackle.
Appendix C. Pseudo-code of the CFSS algorithm
In this appendix we report the pseudo-code of the CFSS algorithm [7], which
solves the GCCF problem corresponding to a given graphG. Notice that, being a
branch and bound algorithm, CFSS requires a technique to compute an upper-
bound M (·) for the characteristic function. A complete discussion about the
techniques used to compute M (·) and, in general, about the CFSS algorithm,
23The implementation is available at https://github.com/filippobistaffa/PK/tree/core.
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Figure B.26: Percentage of SR instances with a non-empty core.
is provided by Bistaﬀa et al. [7].
Algorithm 9 CFSS(G)
1: Gc ← G with all green edges
2: best ← Gc {Initialise current best solution with singletons}
3: F ← ∅ {Initialise search frontier F with empty stack}
4: F.push (Gc) {Push Gc as the ﬁrst node to visit}
5: while F = ∅ do {Branch and bound loop}
6: node ← F.pop () {Get current node}
7: if M (node) > V (best) then {Check bound value}
8: if V (node) > V (best) then
9: best ← node {Update current best solution}
10: F.push (Children (node)) {Update frontier F}
11: return best {Return optimal solution}
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Algorithm 10 Children(G)
1: G′c ← Gc = (A, E , colour) {Initialise graph G′ with Gc}
2: Ch ← ∅ {Initialise the set of children}
3: for all e ∈ E : colour (e) = green do {For all green edges}
4: Ch ← Ch ∪ {GreenEdgeContr (G′c, e)}
5: Mark edge e with colour red in G′c
6: return Ch {Return the set of children}
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